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2. Wolfenstein, Martha. The emergence of fun morality. *J. soc. Issues*, 1951, 7, 15-25.

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Childhood and Mental Health
The Influence of the Father in the Family Setting[1]

INTRODUCTION

Dee G. Applezweig [2]

Southern Illinois University

The role of the father in the family is rapidly becoming a focal concern for many people, professionals and laymen alike. A number of recent studies have helped to emphasize the necessity of taking the father into consideration as an important variable when exploring the behavior and personality development of children. Our presence here today confirms a current professional interest in this problem.

Before we begin, I would like to share with you a somewhat relevant anecdote which may remind us that this is a question with cross-cultural significance.

Last summer, on a bus tour in Stockholm of The World of Tomorrow in Sweden, our guide pointed out many important structures. When he came to a large impressive building, which turned out to be a home for unmarried mothers, he told us he was reminded of a story he had heard recently: A child having a chat with his mother asked, "Mommy, if the doctor brings the baby in his bag, and if Santa Claus brings us toys; if God will punish me when I am bad, and if money grows on trees; *why do we need Daddy?*"

The participants today are going to explore different aspects of this child's question.

[1] Presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association in Chicago, September 1960, this symposium was jointly sponsored by the International Council of Psychologists and Division 7.

[2] Chairman of the symposium and editor.

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THE CHANGING AMERICAN CHILD—A
SPECULATIVE ANALYSIS [1]

URIE BRONFENBRENNER

Cornell University

It is now a matter of scientific record that patterns of child rearing in the United States have changed appreciably over the past twenty-five years(5). At the same time, the gap between social classes in their goals and methods of child rearing appears to be narrowing, with working-class parents beginning to adopt both the values and techniques of the middle class. Finally, there is dramatic correspondence between these observed shifts in parental values and behavior and the changing character of attitudes and practices advocated in successive editions of such widely read manuals as the Children's Bureau bulletin on *Infant Care* and Dr. Spock's *Baby and Child Care*. Such correspondence should not be taken to mean that the expert has now become the principal instigator and instrument of social change, since the ideas of scientists and professional workers themselves reflect in part the operation of deep-rooted cultural processes. Nevertheless, the fact remains that changes in values and practices advocated by prestigeful professional figures can be substantially accelerated by rapid and widespread dissemination through mass media of communication and public discussion.

Given these facts, it becomes especially important to gauge the effect of the changes that are advocated and adopted. We must ask whether the changes that have occurred in the attitudes and actions of parents over the past twenty-five years have been such as to affect the personality development of their children, so that the boys and girls of today are somewhat different in character structure from those of a decade or more ago. Or, to put the question more succinctly: Has the changing American parent produced a changing American child?

A STRATEGY OF INFERENCE

Do we have any basis for answering this intriguing question? Do we have any evidence of changes in the behavior of children in successive

decades analogous to the evidence we have already been able to find for parents(5)?

Unfortunately, the present writer has, to date, been unable to locate enough instances in which comparable methods of behavioral assessment have been employed over an extended period of time with different groups of children of similar ages. Although the absence of such material precludes any direct and unequivocal approach to the question at hand, it is nevertheless possible, through a series of inferences from facts already known, to arrive at some estimate of the effects on children of changing parental attitudes and actions.

Specifically, although as yet we have no comparable data on the relation between parental and child behavior for different families at successive points in time, we do have facts on the influence of parental treatment on child behavior at a given point in time; that is, we know that certain variations in parental behavior tend to be accompanied by systematic differences in the personality characteristics of children. If we are willing to assume that these same relationships obtain not only at a given moment but across different points in time, we are in a position to infer the possible effects on children of changing patterns of child rearing over the years. It is this strategy that we propose to follow.

THE CHANGING AMERICAN PARENT

In a recent analysis of data reported over a twenty-five-year period(5), we have already noted the major changes in parental behavior. These secular trends may be summarized as follows: (a) greater permissiveness toward the child's spontaneous desires; (b) freer expression of affection; (c) increased reliance on indirect "psychological" techniques of discipline (such as reasoning or appeals to guilt) *vs.* direct methods (such as physical punishment, scolding, or threats); (d) in consequence of the above shifts in the direction of what are predominantly middle-class values and techniques, a narrowing of the gap between social classes in their patterns of child rearing.

Since the above analysis was published, a new study has documented an additional trend. Bronson, Katten, and Livson(7) have compared patterns of paternal and maternal authority and affection in two generations of families from the California Guidance Study. Unfortunately, the time span surveyed in their study overlaps only partially with the twenty-five-year period covered in our own analysis, the first California generation having been raised in the early 1900's and the second in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Accordingly, if we are to consider the California results along with the others cited above,/ we must make the somewhat risky assumption that a trend discerned in the first three decades of the century has continued in the same direction through the early 1950's.

With this important qualification, an examination of the data cited by Bronson *et al.* points to a shift over the years in the pattern of parental role differentiation within the family. Specifically, in succeeding generations the relative position of the father vis-a-vis the mother is shifting with the former becoming increasingly more affectionate and less authoritarian and the latter becoming relatively more important as the agent of discipline, especially for boys.

"PSYCHOLOGICAL" TECHNIQUES OF DISCIPLINE AND THEIR EFFECTS

In pursuing our analytic strategy, we seek next for evidence of the effects on the behavior of children of the changes in parental treatment noted in our inventory. We may begin by noting that the variables involved in the first three secular trends listed above constitute a complex that has received considerable attention in recent research on parent-child relations.

Within the last three years, two sets of investigators, working independently, have called attention to the greater efficacy of "love-oriented" or "psychological" techniques in bringing about desired behavior in the child (13, 14, 20). The present writer, noting that such methods are especially favored by middle-class parents, has offered the following analysis of the nature of these techniques and the reasons for their effectiveness.

> Such parents are, in the first place, more likely to overlook offenses, and when they do punish, they are less likely to ridicule or inflict physical pain. Instead, they reason with the youngster, isolate him, appeal to guilt, show disappointment—in short, convey in a variety of ways, on the one hand, the kind of behavior that is expected of the child; on the other, the realization that transgression means the interruption of a mutually valued relationship. . . .
>
> These findings mean that middle class parents, though in one sense more lenient in their discipline techniques, are using methods that are actually more compelling. Moreover, the compelling power of these practices is probably enhanced by the more permissive treatment accorded to middle class children in the early years of life. The successful use of withdrawal of love as a discipline technique implies the prior existence of a gratifying relationship; the more love present in the first instance, the greater the threat implied in its withdrawal (5, p. 419).

It is now a well-established fact that children from middle-class families tend to excel those from lower-class families in many characteristics ordinarily regarded as desirable, such as self-control, achievement, responsibility, leadership, popularity, and adjustment in general (15, pp. 347-352, 429-432). If, as seems plausible, such differences in behavior are attributable at least in part to class-linked variations in parental treatment, the strategy of inference we have adopted would appear on first blush to lead to a rather optimistic conclusion.

Since, over the years, increasing numbers of parents have been adopting the more effective socialization techniques typically employed by the middle class, does it not follow that successive generations of children should show gains in the development of effective behavior and desirable personality characteristics?

Unfortunately, this welcome conclusion, however logical, is premature, for it fails to take into account all of the available facts.

SEX, SOCIALIZATION, AND SOCIAL CLASS

To begin with, the parental behaviors we have been discussing are differentially distributed not only by socioeconomic status but also by sex. As we point out elsewhere(6), girls are exposed to more affection and less punishment than boys but at the same time are more likely to be subjected to love-oriented discipline of the type which encourages the development of internalized controls. And, consistent with our line of reasoning, girls are found repeatedly to be "more obedient, cooperative, and in general better socialized than boys at comparable age levels"(6). But this is not the whole story.

> . . . At the same time, the research results indicate that girls tend to be more anxious, timid, dependent, and sensitive to rejection. If these differences are a function of differential treatment by parents, then it would seem that the more "efficient" methods of child rearing employed with girls involve some risk of what might be called "oversocialization" (6, p. 260).

One could argue, of course, that the contrasting behaviors of boys and girls have less to do with differential parental treatment than with genetically based maturational influences. Nevertheless, two independent lines of evidence suggest that socialization techniques do contribute to individual differences, *within the same sex,* precisely in the types of personality characteristics noted above.

In the first place, variations in child behavior and parental treatment strikingly similar to those we have cited for the two sexes are reported in a recent comprehensive study of differences between first- and later-born children(19). Like girls, first children receive more attention, are more likely to be exposed to psychological discipline, and end up more anxious and dependent, whereas later children, like boys, are more aggressive and self-confident.

A second line of evidence comes from our own current research. We have been concerned with the role of parents in the development of such constructive personality characteristics as responsibility and leadership among adolescent boys and girls. Our findings reveal not only the usual differences in adolescents' and parents' behaviors associated with the sex of the child but also a striking contrast in the relationship between parental and child behaviors for the two sexes.

As we expected, girls were rated by their teachers as more responsible than boys, whereas the latter obtained higher scores on leadership. Expected differences similarly appeared in the realm of parental behavior: Girls received more affection, praise, and companionship; boys were subjected to more physical punishment and achievement demands.

Quite unanticipated, however, at least by us, was the finding that both parental affection and discipline appeared to facilitate effective psychological functioning in boys but to impede the development of such constructive behavior in girls. Closer examination of our data indicated that both extremes of either affection or discipline were deleterious for all children, but that the process of socialization entailed somewhat different risks for the two sexes. Girls were especially susceptible to the detrimental influence of overprotection; boys, to the ill effects of insufficient parental discipline and support. Or, to put it in more colloquial terms: Boys suffered more often from too little taming; girls, from too much.

In an attempt to account for this contrasting pattern of relationships, we proposed the notion of differential optimal levels of affection and authority for the two sexes.

The qualities of independence, initiative, and self-sufficiency, which are especially valued for boys in our culture, apparently require for their development a somewhat different balance of authority and affection than is found in the "love-oriented" strategy characteristically applied with girls. While an affectional context is important for the socialization of boys, it must evidently be accompanied by and be compatible with a strong component of parental discipline. Otherwise, the boy finds himself in the same situation as the girl, who, having received greater affection, is more sensitive to its withdrawal, with the result that a little discipline goes a long way and strong authority is constricting rather than constructive (6, p. 260).

CLASS DIFFERENCES

Available data suggest that this process may already be operating for boys from upper middle-class homes. To begin with, differential treatment of the sexes is at a minimum for these families. Contrasting parental attitudes and behaviors toward boys and girls are pronounced only at lower-class levels and decrease as one moves up the socioeconomic scale(6, 10). Our own results show that it is primarily at lower middle-class levels that boys get more punishment than girls, and the latter receive greater warmth and attention. With an increase in the family's social position, direct discipline drops off, especially for boys, and indulgence and protectiveness decrease for girls. As a result, patterns of parental treatment for the two sexes begin to converge. In like manner, we find that the differential effects of parental behavior on the two sexes are marked only in the lower middle class. It is here that girls are at special risk of being overprotected and boys of not receiving sufficient discipline and support. In the upper middle class

the picture changes. Girls are not as readily debilitated by parental affection and power, nor is parental discipline as effective in fostering the development of responsibility and leadership in boys.

All these trends point to the conclusion that the risks experienced by each sex during the process of socialization tend to be somewhat different at different social class levels. Thus the danger of overprotection for girls is especially great in lower-class families, but less in the upper middle class. Analogously, boys are in greater danger of suffering from inadequate discipline and support in the lower middle than in the upper middle class. But the upper middle-class boy, unlike the girl, exchanges one hazard for another. Since at this upper level the more potent psychological techniques of discipline are likely to be employed with both sexes, the boy presumably now too runs the risk of being oversocialized, of losing some of his capacity for independent aggressive accomplishment.

Accordingly, if our line of reasoning is correct, we should expect a changing pattern of sex differences at successive socioeconomic levels. Specifically, aspects of effective psychological functioning favoring girls should be most pronounced in the upper middle class; those favoring boys, in the lower middle class. A recent analysis of some of our data bears out this expectation. Girls excel boys on such variables as responsibility and social acceptance primarily at the higher socioeconomic levels. In contrast, boys surpass girls on such traits as leadership, level of aspiration, and competitiveness almost exclusively in the lower middle class. Indeed, with a rise in family social position, the differences tend to reverse themselves with girls now excelling boys.

TRENDS IN PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT: A FIRST APPROXIMATION

The implications for our original line of inquiry are clear. We are suggesting that the love-oriented socialization techniques, which over the past twenty-five years have been employed in increasing degree by American middle-class families, may have negative as well as constructive aspects. While fostering the internalization of adult standards and the development of socialized behavior, they may also have the effect of undermining capacities for initiative and independence, particularly in boys. Males exposed to this "modern" pattern of child rearing might be expected to differ from their counterparts of a quarter century ago in being somewhat more conforming and anxious, less enterprising and self-sufficient, and, in general, possessing more of the virtues and liabilities commonly associated with feminine character structure.

At long last, then, our strategy of inference has led us to a first major conclusion. The term "major" is appropriate since the conclusion takes as its points of departure and return four of the secular trends which served as the impetus for our inquiry. Specifically, through a series of empirical links and theoretical extrapolations, we have arrived at an estimate of the

effects on children of the tendency of successive generations of parents to become progressively more permissive, to express affection more freely, to utilize psychological techniques of discipline, and, by moving in these directions, to narrow the gap between the social classes in their patterns of child rearing.

FAMILY STRUCTURE AND PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

But one other secular trend remains to be considered: What of the changing pattern of parental role differentiation during the first three decades of the century? If our extrapolation is correct, the balance of power within the family has continued to shift, with fathers yielding parental authority to mothers and taking on some of the nurturant and affectional functions traditionally associated with the maternal role. Again we have no direct evidence of the effects of this change on successive generations of children and must look to analogous data on contemporary relationships.

We may begin by considering the contribution of each parent to the socialization processes we have examined thus far. Our data indicate that it is primarily mothers who tend to employ love-oriented techniques of discipline and fathers who rely on more direct methods like physical punishment. The above statement must be qualified, however, by reference to the sex of the child, for it is only in relation to boys that fathers use direct punishment more than mothers. More generally:

> . . . the results reveal a tendency for each parent to be somewhat more active, firm, and demanding with a child of the same sex, more lenient and indulgent with a child of the opposite sex. The reversal is most complete with respect to discipline, with fathers being stricter with boys, mothers with girls. In the spheres of affection and overprotectiveness, there is no actual shift in preference, but the tendency to be especially warm and solicitous with girls is much more pronounced among fathers than among mothers. In fact, generally speaking, it is the father who is especially likely to treat children of the two sexes differently (6, p. 249).

Consistent with this pattern of results, it is primarily the behavior of fathers that accounts for the differential effects of parental behavior on the two sexes and for the individual differences within each sex. In other words, it is paternal authority and affection that tend especially to be salutary for sons but detrimental for daughters.

But as might be anticipated from what we already know, these trends are pronounced only in the lower middle class; with a rise in the family's social status, both parents tend to have similar effects on their children, both within and across sexes. Such a trend is entirely to be expected since parental role differentiation tends to decrease markedly as one ascends the socio-economic ladder. It is almost exclusively in lower middle-class homes that fathers are stricter with boys, and mothers with girls. To the extent that direct discipline is employed in upper middle-class families, it tends to be

exercised by both parents equally. Here again we see a parallelism between shifts in parental behavior across time and social class in the direction of forms (in this instance of family structure) favored by the upper middle-class group.

What kinds of children, then, can we expect to develop in families in which the father plays a predominantly affectionate role, and a relatively low level of discipline is exercised equally by both parents? A tentative answer to this question is supplied by a preliminary analysis of our data in which the relation between parental role structure and adolescent behavior was examined with controls for the family's social position. The results of this analysis are summarized as follows:

> . . . Both responsibility and leadership are fostered by the relatively greater salience of the parent of the same sex. . . . Boys tend to be more responsible when the father rather than the mother is the principal discipli-narian; girls are more dependable when the mother is the major authority figure. . . . In short, boys thrive in a patriarchal context, girls in a matri-archal. . . . The most dependent and least dependable adolescents describe family arrangements that are neither patriarchal nor matriarchal, but equali-tarian. To state the issue in more provocative form, our data suggest that the democratic family, which for so many years has been held up and aspired to as a model by professionals and enlightened laymen, tends to produce young people who "do not take initiative," "look to others for direction and decision," and "cannot be counted on to fulfill obligations" (6, p. 267).

In the wake of so sweeping a conclusion, it is important to call attention to the tentative, if not tenuous, character of our findings. The results were based on a single study employing crude questionnaire methods and rating scales. Also, our interpretation is limited by the somewhat attenuated character of most of the families classified as patriarchal or matriarchal in our sample. Extreme concentrations of power in one or the other parent were comparatively rare. Had they been more frequent, we suspect the data would have shown that such extreme asymmetrical patterns of authority are detrimental rather than salutary for effective psychological develop-ment, perhaps even more disorganizing than equalitarian forms.

Nevertheless, our findings do receive some peripheral support in the work of others. A number of investigations, for example, point to the special importance of the father in the socialization of boys(4, 16). Further corroborative evidence appears in studies of the effects of paternal ab-sence(1, 12, 21, 23). The absence of the father apparently not only affects the behavior of the child directly but also influences the mother in the direction of greater overprotectiveness. The effect of both these tendencies is especially critical for male children; boys from father-absent homes tend to be markedly more submissive and dependent. Studies dealing explicitly with the influence of parental role structure in intact families are few and far between.

Papanek, in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, reports greater sex role differentiation among children from homes in which the parental roles were differentiated (17). And in a carefully controlled study, Kohn and Clausen find that "schizophrenic patients more frequently than normal persons . . . report that their mothers played a very strong authority role and their fathers a very weak authority role" (11, p. 309).

Finally, what might best be called complementary evidence for our inferences regarding trends in family structure and their effects comes from the work of Miller and Swanson (13) and their associates on the differing patterns of behavior exhibited by families from *bureaucratic* and *entrepreneurial* work settings. These investigators argue that the bureaucratic-entrepreneurial dichotomy represents a new cleavage in American social structure that cuts across and overrides social class influences and carries with it its own characteristic patterns of family structure and socialization. Thus one investigation (8) contrasts the exercise of power in families of husbands employed in two kinds of job situations: (a) those working in large organizations with three or more levels of supervision; and (b) those self-employed or working in small organizations with few levels of supervision. With appropriate controls for social class, equalitarian families were found more frequently in the bureaucratic group; patriarchal and, to a lesser extent, matriarchal, in the entrepreneurial setting.

Miller and Swanson (13) show that parents from these same two groups tend to favor rather different means and ends of socialization, with entrepreneurial families putting considerably more emphasis on the use of psychological techniques of discipline. These differences appear at both upper and lower middle-class levels but are less pronounced in higher socioeconomic strata. It is Miller and Swanson's belief, however, that the trend is toward the bureaucratic way of life, with its less structured patterns of family organization and child rearing. The evidence we have cited on secular changes in family structure and the inferences we have drawn regarding their possible effects on personality development are on the whole consistent with their views.

LOOKING FORWARD

If Miller and Swanson are correct in the prediction that America is moving toward a bureaucratic society that emphasizes, to put it colloquially, "getting along" rather than "getting ahead," then presumably we can look forward to ever increasing numbers of equalitarian families who, in turn, will produce successive generations of ever more adaptable but unaggressive "organization men." But recent signs do not all point in this direction. In our review of secular trends in child-rearing practices (5), we detected in the data from the more recent studies a slowing up in the headlong rush toward greater permissiveness and toward reliance on indirect methods of discipline. We pointed out also that if the most recent editions of well-thumbed

guidebooks on child care are as reliable harbingers of the future as they have been in the past, we can anticipate something of a return to the more explicit techniques of an earlier era.

Perhaps the most important forces acting to redirect both the aims and methods of child rearing in America emanate from behind the Iron Curtain. With the firing of the first sputnik, achievement began to replace adjustment as the highest goal of the American way of life. We have become concerned, perhaps even obsessed, with "education for excellence" and the maximal utilization of our intellectual resources. Already, ability grouping and the guidance counselor who is its prophet have moved down from the junior high to the elementary school, and parents can be counted on to do their part in preparing their youngsters for survival in the new competitive world of applications and achievement tests.

But if a new trend in parental behavior is to develop, it must do so in the context of changes already under way. And if the focus of parental authority is shifting from husband to wife, then perhaps we should anticipate that pressures for achievement will be imposed primarily by mothers rather than fathers. Moreover, the mother's continuing strong emotional investment in the child should provide her with a powerful lever for evoking desired performance. It is noteworthy in this connection that recent studies of the familial origins of need-achievement point to the matriarchy as the optimal context for development of the motive to excel(18, 22).

The prospect of a society in which socialization techniques are directed toward maximizing achievement drive is not altogether a pleasant one. As a number of investigators have shown(2, 3, 9, 18, 24), high achievement motivation appears to flourish in a family atmosphere of "cold democracy" in which initial high levels of maternal involvement are followed by pressures for independence and accomplishment. Nor does the product of this process give ground for reassurance. True, children from achievement-oriented homes excel in planning ability and performance, but they are also more aggressive, tense, domineering, and cruel(2, 3, 9). It would appear that education for excellence, if pursued single-mindedly, may entail some sobering social costs.

But by now we are in danger of having stretched our chain of inference beyond the strength of its weakest link. Our speculative analysis has become far more speculative than analytic and to pursue it further would bring us past the bounds of science into the realms of science fiction. In concluding our discussion, we would re-emphasize that speculations should, by their very nature, be held suspect. It is for good reason that, like "damn Yankees," they too carry their almost inseparable sobriquets: Speculations are either *idle* or *wild*. Given the scientific and social importance of the issues we have raised, we would dismiss the first of these labels out of hand, but the second cannot be disposed of so easily. Like the impetuous child, the wild speculation responds best to the sobering influence of

friendly but firm discipline, in this instance from the hand of the behavioral scientist.

As we look ahead to the next twenty-five years of human socialization, let us hope that the optimal levels of involvement and discipline can be achieved not only by the parent who is unavoidably engaged in the process but also by the scientist who attempts to understand its working and who, also unavoidably, contributes to shaping its course.

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THE ABSENT FATHER AND CROSS-SEX IDENTITY[1]

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In this paper, we shall present evidence on the effect of the father's position in the family as it relates to the growing child's learning by identification and to the development of his sex identity. This evidence consists first of a cross-cultural study done at the Laboratory of Human Development, Harvard University,[2] and second, a review of recent research in the United States and Europe, relevant to our theory of identification, on the effect of father absence in the household.

THE STATUS ENVY HYPOTHESIS

Before presenting this evidence, however, we would like to state our view on the process of identification and the development of identity. This view we would like to call the *status envy hypothesis*. This hypothesis may be summarily stated as follows: The process of identification consists of the covert practice of the role of an envied status. Identification consists of learning a role by rehearsal in fantasy or in play rather than by actual performance, and this rehearsal is motivated by envy of the incumbent of a privileged status.

Let us consider the mother-infant relationship in which the mother attempts to satisfy all of the infant's needs. According to our theory, if it were possible for the mother to supply everything the infant wanted, he would not identify with her as he already occupies the privileged status. Some learning does, of course, take place in such a complementary relationship. The child learns to give the proper signals when he wants something

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[1] This paper is a shortened revision of the paper read at the symposium.

[2] The first portion of this paper constituting the theoretical formulation and supporting cross-cultural material is based on a presentation of the status envy hypothesis given by John W. M. Whiting at Tulane University as part of the Mona Bronsman Sheckman Lectures in Social Psychiatry, March 17-19, 1960. These lectures, called "Social Structure and Child Rearing: A Theory of Identification," provide a more extended presentation of this material and will be published as a monograph at a later date.

and to accept and consume it when it is offered. Furthermore, he learns to predict certain sequences of events determined by his mother's behavior. In other words, he has cognizance of his mother's role. Although this cognizance may provide some savings in later learning, if and when he is motivated to perform her role, we would like to distinguish cognizance of a complementary role from identification with its incumbent.

To clarify our view of the motivation leading to identification, we would like to introduce the concept of a resource. A resource is anything, material or nonmaterial, which somebody wants and over which someone else may have control. Resources include food, water, optimum temperature, freedom from pain, and the derived symbolic resources such as love, solace, power, information, and success. Were these resources inexhaustible, and equally and completely available to all, there would be no such thing as status envy and, by our hypothesis, no learning by identification. Such, however, is not the case. As part of the cultural rules of every society, there is a status system which gives privileged access to resources for some positions in the system and, at the same time, disbars other positions from controlling and consuming them.

Returning to our mother-child example: As soon as the mother withholds a resource from her child and, by virtue of her position in the family, either herself consumes it or gives it to someone else, the conditions for status envy obtain. Even during infancy in societies where an infant occupies the most privileged status, complete nurturance is practically impossible. No matter how much a mother might wish to be ever-loving, the exigencies of life are such that there are times when she must withhold some resource that the child wants.

This is particularly true during the process of socialization. By definition this process involves teaching the child to delay gratification and to defer to the rights of others. More specifically, socialization involves teaching the child the privileges and disabilities which characterize the social structure of his society.

We may now restate our major hypothesis: If there is a status that has privileged access to a desired resource, the incumbent or occupant of such a status will be envied by anyone whose status does not permit him the control of, and the right to use, the resource. Status envy is then a motivational component of status disability, and such motivation leads to learning by identification.

This view differs from some other theories of identification in that we hold that a completely satisfying complementary relation between two people will not lead to identification. By this hypothesis, a child maximally identifies with people who consume resources in his presence but do not give him any. He does not identify with the people he loves unless they withhold from him something he wants. Love alone will not produce identification. Thus, the status envy hypothesis advanced here makes identi-

fication with the aggressor just a special case, and the Oedipal situation is also simply a special case.

The actual process of learning by identification consists of the covert practice in fantasy or in play of the role of the envied status. So when the child wants to stay up late, for example, and his parents make him go to bed while they themselves stay up, the child says to himself, "I wish I were grown up. Perhaps if I acted as they do I would be grown up," and he goes to sleep rehearsing, in fantasy, grown-up behavior.

ATTRIBUTED, SUBJECTIVE, AND OPTATIVE IDENTITY

We would now like to present our views on another concept which we believe will be useful in distinguishing households with fathers absent from those with fathers present. This is the concept of identity.

In every society, statuses have names or labels. In our society, for example, there are the familiar kinship statuses of mother, father, uncle, aunt, brother, sister; the age-determined statuses of infant, child, adolescent, adult, and aged; the occupational statuses of doctor, lawyer, clerk, workman, etc.; and, especially important to our thesis, the sex-determined statuses of male and female.

We would like to define a person's position or positions in the status system of this society as his identity. Furthermore, we would like to distinguish three kinds of identity: attributed, subjective, and optative. *Attributed identity* consists of the statuses assigned to a person by other members of his society. *Subjective identity* consists of the statuses a person sees himself as occupying. And finally, *optative identity* consists of those statuses a person wishes he could occupy but from which he is disbarred. It is this last kind of identity that is most important for this paper.

Obviously, one's optative identity derives from status envy, and nothing much would be added to our theory by introducing this concept if one's optative identity were always objective and realistic. The wish being father to the thought, however, this is frequently not the case, and people often feel "I am what I would like to be." In such a case, the subjective and optative identities merge and become discrepant with the attributed identity.

It is our thesis that the aim of socialization in any society is to produce an adult whose attributed, subjective, and optative identities are isomorphic: "I see myself as others see me, and I am what I want to be." It is further presumed, however, that such isomorphism can only be achieved by passing through a stage in which there is status disbarment, status envy, and thus a discrepancy between one's optative and attributed identities. That is, to become such an adult, a person must have been deprived of the privileged consumption of resources accorded only to adults. This disbarment results in his wanting to be a member of that class. When society then permits him to occupy this privileged status, there is agreement in what he wants to be, in what society says he is, and in what he sees himself to be.

CROSS-CULTURAL EVIDENCE

Having briefly presented our views on learning by identification and on identity, let us now turn to the consideration of some empirical data which may provide a test of these notions. The first such test will be cross-cultural. The independent variables are judgments as to the distribution of resources during infancy and during childhood. Specifically, social structure of a sample of societies was judged for the degree to which the father and adult males in general, or the mother and adult females in general, occupied privileged or equivalent statuses as perceived by the infant and later by the child. Arrangements in infancy lead to *primary identification;* whereas those in childhood lead to *secondary identification.*

It is our assumption, and this has been supported by a previous study (14), that sleeping arrangements provide the best index of status envy during infancy. The bed seems to be the center of a child's world during the first year or two of his life. This is where the resources of greatest value to him are given or withheld, and those who share this setting with him become the model for his first or primary identification.

In most societies the world over, an infant sleeps during the nursing period either in his mother's bed, or in a crib or cradle right next to it, and within easy reach. Of over 100 societies on which we have data on sleeping arrangements, the American middle class is unique in putting the baby to sleep in a room of his own.

For our purposes, the big difference lies in whether or not the father also sleeps with the mother. In a sample of 64 societies which we would like to report now, 36 of them have the pattern of the father and mother sleeping apart, and the infant thus has the exclusive attention of the mother at night. In the remaining 28 societies, the infant either shares his mother's bed with his father or in a few instances sleeps alone. According to our theory, these two arrangements should be profoundly different in their effect on the infant's first or primary identification.

In the exclusive mother-infant case, the mother should be seen as all-powerful, all-important, and, insofar as she sometimes withholds resources, the person to be envied; and we predict the infant will covertly practice her role, and his optative identity will be female. In societies where the father sleeps with the mother, quite a different picture obtains with respect to valued resources. In this instance, both parents give and withhold important resources. Under these conditions, therefore, we assume the envied status to be that of a parent of either sex. For the infant, the juxtaposition of privilege is seen as between self and adult, rather than between self and female.

Thus the male infant in societies with exclusive mother-child sleeping arrangements should have a primary cross-sex optative identity, whereas the

boy reared in societies in which the father sleeps with the mother should have a primary adult optative identity.

After a child is weaned and becomes what Margaret Mead calls a yard child, conditions may change drastically from those of infancy. Privilege may now be defined by marital residence. Three major patterns emerge in our samples of societies: patrilocal, matrilocal, and equilocal.

In societies with patrilocal residence, a man will remain throughout his life in or near the house in which he was born, his wife or wives moving in from another village. In such societies, the domestic unit consists of a group of males closely related by blood, and a group of inmarrying and interloping females. Prestige and power are clearly vested in this group of men, and adult males are the ones to be envied.

Societies with matrilocal residence are a mirror image of the patrilocal case. Here the daughters stay at home and their husbands are the interlopers. In such societies, by contrast with the patrilocal, women occupy the privileged and envied statuses.

Equilocal societies are more familiar to us. Here a young husband and wife set up a household of their own apart from the parents of either, as is generally the case in our own society; or they may choose between, or alternate between, living with the wife's parents and the husband's parents. In this instance, residence does not automatically give advantage to either men or women, and sex identity is thus not an important issue.

Thus residence patterns may provide the conditions for the envy of males or the envy of females; or sex-determined statuses may be relatively unprivileged. This distribution of resources in the domestic unit provides the conditions for what we would like to call secondary identification.

SOME PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OPTATIVE IDENTIFICATION COMBINATIONS

Although the two types of sleeping arrangements and three residence patterns yield six combinations of conditions for primary and secondary identification, we would like here to concentrate on only two of them in contrast to all others. These are, first, the societies which should produce the maximum conflict between primary and secondary optative sex identity: e.g., societies with both exclusive mother-infant sleeping arrangements, which should lead a boy initially to wish he were feminine, and patrilocal residence patterns, which should lead him subsequently and secondarily to want to be masculine. The other societies of interest to us are those which promote feminine identification, both initially and secondarily; that is, societies with both exclusive mother-child sleeping arrangements and matrilocal residence.

Having described our independent variables, let us now turn to the dependent variables which should be predicted by our theory from (a) maximum conflict in optative sex identity and (b) maximum feminine optative sex identity.

Initiation Hypothesis

In a previous study(14), male initiation rites at puberty were shown to be strongly associated with exclusive mother-child sleeping arrangements and a long post-partum sex taboo. Although cross-sex identification was mentioned in a footnote as a possible interpretation of these findings, the authors' major explanation was based on the assumption that these conditions exacerbated the Oedipal conflict, and that initiation rites were the symbolic expression of resolution of this conflict.

We now believe, and would like to present evidence, that the sex identity interpretation is the more valid and fruitful. We would like to present the cross-sex identity and initiation hypothesis explicitly as follows: In societies with maximum conflict in sex identity, e.g., where a boy initially sleeps exclusively with his mother and where the domestic unit is patrilocal and hence controlled by men, there will be initiation rites at puberty which function to resolve this conflict in identity.

This hypothesis suggests that the initiation rites serve psychologically to brainwash the primary feminine identity and to establish firmly the secondary male identity. The hazing, sleeplessness, tests of manhood, and painful genital operation, together with promise of high status—that of being a man if the tests are successfully passed—are indeed similar to the brainwashing techniques employed by the Communists. Indicating how traumatic these rites may be, one ethnographer(11) reports that boys returning home after initiation did not know their village or recognize their parents.

Native theory also supports our interpretation. In most societies with elaborate initiation rites at puberty, there are two terms labeling one's sex identity which are different from the ones with which we are familiar. One term refers to all women and uninitiated boys, whereas the other refers to initiated males only. In these societies, according to native theory, a male is born twice: once into the woman-child status, and then at puberty he symbolically dies and is reborn into the status of manhood.

Let us now turn to our data. In our sample of 64 societies, there were 13 in which there were elaborate initiation ceremonies with genital operations. All 13 of these had the exclusive mother-infant sleeping arrangements which we predicted would cause a primary feminine identification. Furthermore, 12 of these 13 had patrilocal residence which we predicted would produce the maximum conflict in identity and hence the need for an institution to help resolve this conflict. A chi-square test of the association is fantastically beyond chance. Expressed simply, 87½ per cent of the 64 societies fall in the cells predicted by our hypothesis.

But what of societies where the female status is seen as privileged both in infancy and in childhood, where the infant sleeps exclusively with his mother and in childhood moves into a world controlled by his mother, his aunts, and his tyrannical maternal grandmother? Here our theory would

predict that a man would have a strong optative feminine identity, and the society should provide him some means to act out, symbolically at least, the female role.

From the beginnings of ethnographic reporting, a strange custom has been described for various societies over the world. This custom consists of the husband going to bed and undergoing all the same taboos as his wife during the time she is in labor. This custom is known as the *couvade* and has long been a favorite example for undergraduate texts in anthropology to exemplify the curious customs of primitive peoples. As a test of our hypothesis, however, the couvade is most apt. What event more than childbirth defines that part of a woman's role that is uniquely feminine? It seems to us, at least, that when a man attempts to participate in the birth of his child by closely imitating the behavior of his wife, this should be a good index of his wish to act out the feminine role and thus symbolically to be in part a woman.

Our hypothesis is again strongly confirmed by the data. Of the 12 societies with couvade in our sample, 10 had exclusive mother-child sleeping arrangements and 9 had matrilocal residence. Again, the results are highly significant statistically. In this instance, 90 per cent of the cases fall in the predicted cells.

AMERICAN CULTURE EVIDENCE

Cross-cultural evidence thus seems to confirm the status envy hypothesis with respect to sex identity. Now let us turn to other studies done within our own cultural context which seem relevant and yet were not specifically designed with this theory in mind. A recent book by Rohrer and Edmonson, *The Eighth Generation*(8), seems especially significant. This study is a follow-up twenty years later of the people described in *Children of Bondage* by Davis and Dollard(2). The problems of identification and identity are stressed throughout, and the importance of what we have called primary feminine identification clearly presented.

The girls raised in the matriarchy, which coincides with our exclusive mother-infant case, are very likely to establish a matriarchal home of their own and to live with their mothers or very close to them. The boys from this kind of household also seem to conform to our theoretical expectations. If the boy finds that he falls under the dominance of older men when he leaves his house, in these cases a gang of older boys, he shows evidence of a sex role conflict in compulsive denial of anything feminine. Rohrer and Edmonson conclude that "the gang member rejects this femininity in every form, and he sees it in women and in effeminate men, in laws and morals and religion, in schools and occupational striving"(8, p. 163).

This compulsive masculine behavior is also described by Walter Miller(6) in his discussion of the "focal concerns" of the lower-class culture. He emphasizes that the "female-based" household and "serial monogamy"

are characteristics of the "hard core" of this lower class and closely associated with delinquent gang behavior. He argues that delinquent acts function as means of resolving dominant motivational themes in the lower-class community, which he views as "a long-established, distinctively patterned tradition with an integrity of its own—rather than a so-called 'delinquent subculture' which has arisen through conflict with middle class culture"(6, pp. 5-6).

In Miller's writings and in *The Eighth Generation* are descriptions of the requirements for gang membership, requirements which closely resemble the attributes of the initiation ceremonies of primitive societies, especially the "tests of manhood." Miller specifically relates the focal concern of "toughness" to conflict over sexual identity:

> . . . Among its [toughness] most important components are physical prowess, evidenced both by demonstrated possession of strength and endurance and athletic skill; "masculinity," symbolized by a distinctive complex of acts and avoidances (bodily tattooing; absence of sentimentality; non-concern with "art," "literature," conceptualization of women as conquest objects, etc.); and bravery in the face of physical threat (6, p. 9).

The attributes of this male model are seen in the prototypical "private eye" of television: "hard, fearless, undemonstrative, skilled in physical combat," and irresistible as a Don Juan(6, p. 9). Behavior deviating from this stereotype is evidence of one's being a homosexual. Miller also attributes the genesis of this obsessive concern with masculinity to a cross-sex primary identification and considers the behavior a type of compulsive reaction formation. This interpretation is, of course, closely attuned to the status envy hypothesis we have described.

In their study of delinquency, the Gluecks report that more of the delinquent boys, as compared with the nondelinquents, came from homes "broken by desertion, separation, divorce, or death of one or both parents, many of the breaches occurring during the early childhood of the boys"(3, p. 280). They further indicate that the fathers of the delinquents tend to be irresponsible in family matters and to have far poorer work habits than the fathers of the nondelinquents. If many of these broken homes were actually exclusive mother-infant or female-based households, and it seems from most reports on the lower class that this is a fairly safe assumption, these results are consonant with Miller's interpretation that delinquent acts conform to the focal concerns of boys raised in the mother-child household.

Concentrating on the "good" boy in a high delinquency area, Reckless, Dinitz, and Murray(7), and more recently with Scarpitti(9), found that the nondelinquent boy comes from an intact family which is quite stable. These boys also felt accepted by their parents and expressed acceptance of them. These relationships with their parents were markedly different from those of a group of boys being held in a detention home.

The studies we have just considered found family structure an important factor in the early lives of the subjects. This relationship was found as a result of the analyses of the data which the investigators had gathered in order to study the culture as a whole or with special focus on delinquency. Let us now turn to some investigations which have the presence or absence of the father as the selected variable for study.

FATHER ABSENCE AND PRESENCE

The draft at the beginning of World War II made possible several studies comparing middle-class children from father-absent homes with those from father-present households (1, 10, 12). These studies indicated that boys from father-absent households behaved like girls both in fantasy behavior and in overt behavior, especially with respect to producing very little aggression. Investigating the effect on the child of the father's return, Stolz (12) found that boys whose fathers had been absent but were then returned, continued to be effeminate in overt behavior, but there was a marked change in their fantasy behavior. This group now produced the maximum amount of aggression in fantasy. These conditions of father absence for the initial years and then control by an adult man are the conditions we have indicated should produce conflict over sexual identification.

The influence of father absence on the child has also been studied in Norway (4, 5, 13). The families of sailors were compared with other families of the same social class in which the fathers were present. The absence of these fathers often extended for two or more years. The results showed the wives of the sailors were more isolated from social contacts, more overprotective, and more concerned with obedience rather than happiness and self-realization for their children than were the nuclear household mothers, i.e., mothers whose husbands were not away from the household. The boys of the sailor families tended to be infantile and dependent and to manifest conflict over identification through compensatory or overly masculine behavior as compared with the father-present boys.

These data are suggestive for our theory, but we would also be interested in what happens to those boys later on. It would be interesting to know whether or not these boys themselves tend to become sailors, an occupation which would be suitable for a man who places a high value on obedience and also permits a man to perform acts of the female role in cleaning his quarters, sewing, etc., that are necessary on an extended sea voyage. The age of their first voyage and a description of the treatment accorded them as novitiate seamen would be pertinent. We would not be surprised, according to our theory, if these boys from sailor households themselves became sailors, made their first voyage during adolescence, and underwent a rather severe initiation ceremony on their first trip.

These studies, then, seem generally consistent with our cross-cultural findings in that the absence of the father produces in the boy cross-sex identi-

fication which is either acted out or, more usually, defended against by exaggerated masculine behavior. Although the conditions differentiating primary and secondary identification are not as clearly specified in these studies as in the cross-cultural study, it does seem clear that the gang is an institution with a function similar to that of initiation, and that at least certain types of delinquent behavior are equivalent to the tests of manhood in those societies with conflict in sex identity. ·

Further Research

Although the general effect of father absence seems evident, the details of the process are not. For example, are there critical periods when the absence of a father is more crucial than other times? How long does it take for a child to establish identity? What are the relative effects of a weak father and an absent father? What is the effect of the absent father on the development of a girl?

Some of these details are being investigated at the Laboratory of Human Development at Harvard University, and others at the National Institutes of Health at Bethesda, Maryland, but these studies are not far enough along to warrant reporting here. It seems to us, however, that the effect of the household structure on the process of identification provides a very fruitful area for research.

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THE FATHER'S ROLE IN THE FAMILY AND THE CHILD'S PEER-GROUP ADJUSTMENT

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The data that I shall report this morning were obtained in a larger study dealing with the effects of family structure on the child's peer-group relations. Ronald Lippitt and I are codirecting this study. The sample consists of 445 boys and girls in the third through sixth grades of Detroit elementary schools. All are from white, nonimmigrant, intact families and represent a socioeconomic cross section of this population.

Structured questionnaires were administered to the children. These dealt with the parents' relationship to each other and to the child, the child's feelings about his parents and about himself, and his emotional responses to situations at home and at school. Mail-in questionnaires which included attitude scales were completed by most of the mothers and fathers. In addition, 120 selected mothers were interviewed in their homes. The child's peer relationships were assessed through teacher ratings and classroom sociometrics.

Although the study did not focus on the effects of the father on the child's peer-group adjustment, it includes data which can be analyzed for such effects. I shall concentrate in this paper on two aspects of the father's role: his relationship with his wife and his relationship with his child.

FATHER-MOTHER RELATIONSHIPS

Turning first to the father's relationship with his wife, I would like to discuss the power relationship and the affectional relationship. Each of these is related to the child's choice of model and his role in his school peer group. However, we have found, as a study by Baruch and Wilcox(2) has also indicated, that the power relationship is more important for boys and the affectional, for girls.

Power was a particularly important variable in our study, and the husband-wife power relationship was measured in several ways. One measure was based on the children's reports of who decided about a number of household activities and who carried them out. The more powerful parent was the one who more often made decisions about the other parent's activities. Another measure of power was based on the mother's interview report of which parent dominated several major family decisions.

With either measure, we found that the boys, when asked the question "Who do you want to be like when you grow up?" wanted to be like the

more powerful parent or like someone of the same sex as that parent. Thus, the boys who chose a female (12 per cent of the boys in the sample) were disproportionately from homes where the mother was dominant in the marital relationship. These findings were significant in both the white- and blue-collar classes. With girls, the association between power and model choice was not as strong, but they tended to choose the nondominant parent as the one they would like to be like. Those who choose a male (10 per cent of the girls) were disproportionately from mother-dominant homes. In other words, when the mother was dominant, both boys and girls more often rejected the same-sex parent and chose opposite-sex persons, but this relationship was stronger for boys than for girls.

A similar finding has been reported by Kohn and Clausen(10) with hospitalized schizophrenic adults. They found that males preferred the parent who had dominated the decisions in the family, whereas females preferred the nondominant parent. They also report that schizophrenics are more likely than normals to come from mother-dominated homes.

In our study we were less concerned with the affectional relationship between parents, and so our measures of this variable are less adequate. They include a pair of items in the children's questionnaire which asked how often each parent would do things for the other. Girls who indicated high mutual responsiveness by their parents were significantly more likely to say that they would like to be like their mothers. A better measure of marital affection was based on whether the mothers who were interviewed felt that marriage was mainly a positive or negative experience. This was indicated by their responses to the question "Now thinking about a woman's life, how is a woman's life changed by being married?" We found that the girls whose mothers saw marriage as a positive change were more likely to choose their mothers as a model. Neither of these measures was related to the boys' choice. One other relevant measure was the child's report of parental disagreement about how much the child should participate in various household activities. Both boys and girls who reported high disagreement tended to avoid choosing either parent as a model and more often chose peers.

Before leaving this modeling question, it should be noted that the tendency of boys to choose dominant fathers means dominant in relation to the mother, not to the boy. In fact, the father is most likely to be the boy's choice when the boy has influence over a father who is the more dominant one in the marital relationship. A warm companionship with the father and a situation in which the mother rather than the father handles the routine child care activities also lead both boys and girls to choose the same-sex parent.

Not only is the marital power relationship more important for the boys' choice of model, but it is also more important with respect to their peer-group behavior. Thus we find that boys from mother-dominant families are

aggressive, impulsive, unfriendly, and unsuccessful in their influence attempts, according to the teacher ratings. Furthermore, their aggressiveness is more often expressed toward peers than toward teachers and toward girls than boys. In their sociometric ratings of others, they indicated that they disliked girls, and the girls in turn rated *them* as low on power.

It is interesting to note that although the boys from mother-dominant homes disliked girls, they showed a slight tendency toward rating them as more powerful. However, more important here than the actual parent power relationship is the father's attitude. If the boy's father indicates an attitude favoring male dominance, the boy will rate other boys much higher on power than he will rate girls.

Girls from mother-dominant homes also had difficult relations with the opposite sex and were disliked by boys. They show a pattern of overcontrol of impulses, however, instead of the undercontrol pattern evidenced by boys from mother-dominated homes.

In examining the effects of the parents' affectional relationship on the child's peer-group behavior, we were limited, as I have indicated, by the fact that our best measure of the affectional relationship was the mother's response to the question "How does marriage change a woman's life?" Aside from the problems inherent in measuring a complex concept with a single question, this measure was available only for the 120 families in which the mother was interviewed. With social class and sex of child controlled, there were only 30 in each group. However the results obtained with this measure are quite provocative.

For once, sex turned out to be less important than social class. Thus, while in the white-collar group a positive view of marriage was related to a positive adjustment by the child, in the blue-collar group the relationship was reversed. In the blue-collar group, the children of mothers giving positive responses were disliked by other children, considered to be low on power, and lacking in peer-relevant skills. Their teachers rated them high on dependency and reported that their responses to frustration were crying, destructiveness, or some other immature and nonadaptive behavior. All of these relationships for the blue-collar children were statistically significant.

One hypothesis that might account for this pattern is that the wife and mother roles are more compatible in the white-collar than in the blue-collar class. The white-collar group has more money available for baby sitters and household assistance, and family size is more often limited and planned. The concept of motherhood no longer involves the Puritanical notions still prevalent in the blue-collar class and, indeed, may even have acquired a certain amount of glamour. In fact, we found that the white-collar group reported a great deal more husband-wife interaction than the blue-collar group. This adds some support to the idea that in the white-collar class the husband-wife relationship is more likely to remain active after there are children. It seemed possible, therefore, that the blue-collar woman who especially values

the marriage relationship might default in her role as *parent* because it interferes with her relationship with her husband.

This line of reasoning led us to predict that a favorable view of the marriage would relate positively to the child's report of maternal affection in the white-collar class, but negatively in the blue-collar class. The data support this hypothesis.

Valuing the marriage relationship, then, tends to go with a warm mother-child relationship and good child adjustment in the white-collar class but with a lack of warmth and poor child adjustment in the blue-collar class.

FATHER-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS

In turning now to the father's relationship with the child, we will concentrate on the disciplining and affectional aspects of this relationship, and particularly on how the father's discipline and affection differ from the mother's in their effects.

The children in our sample were asked to indicate which persons they associated with a number of behaviors, e.g., "Who punishes, praises, hits, explains . . .?" From their responses, we obtained measures of the extent to which each parent was associated with positive affect, discipline, and instruction. Both boys and girls, white-collar and blue-collar, associated their fathers more than mothers with discipline and less than mothers with positive affect and instruction. However, boys attributed more discipline, positive affect, and instruction to fathers than girls did.

The same general pattern emerges from the mother interviews. Although the mothers report that they discipline more often than fathers, they say that fathers are stricter. Furthermore, they indicate that fathers are more likely to discipline boys than girls and have more positive interaction with boys, while the mothers have more positive interaction with girls.

Social class differences are much less striking than sex differences. From other studies, we know that there are class differences in the child-rearing techniques parents use and the acts for which children are punished. Our data also indicate that white-collar boys receive less discipline and more positive affect from both parents than blue-collar boys. However, we found very few differences between white- and blue-collar families with respect to which parent performs the disciplining or affectional functions. The only difference which approached significance was the tendency for white-collar boys compared with blue to report more participation by fathers in routine child care activities. While it is possible that more objective and detailed data would yield class differences, it should be noted that our failure to find differences is consistent with data reported recently by Kohn(9).

In considering the effects of the father-child relationship, there are three units of analysis that I would like to discuss. The first considers the father as disciplinarian; the second considers the father as a source of affection;

and the third deals with the father-child relationship as it affects the child's perception of others.

Discipline

The first unit deals with an attempt to replicate an earlier study which was concerned with the father's role as disciplinarian. The late Andrew Henry and his associates(4, 5, 8) established an empirical link between aggressiveness in males and the perception that the father rather than the mother was disciplinarian. My colleagues and I(11) have previously reported data from a small pilot study which was designed to test the hypothesis that this relationship is a function of the affectional supplies more typically residing in the mother. The theory was that when the mother disciplines, the expression (perhaps even the feeling) of hostility is too threatening to the child because it endangers the major supply of love and nurturance. Therefore, the child responds with repression and a nonassertive behavior pattern.

In this earlier study, we selected for special comparison families in which the conventional roles were reversed: the mother being the disciplinarian and the father the source of love. The data indicated that when both the affectional and disciplining functions resided in the same person, mother or father, aggression was turned inward, and the child's behavior was nonassertive; but when they resided in different persons, aggression was turned outward, and the child's behavior was assertive. Thus, our tentative conclusion was that father discipline is related to child aggressiveness and mother discipline to repression and intrapunitiveness because expressing hostility is too threatening when the disciplinarian is also the main source of love.

I am sorry to say that we have not been able to replicate these findings in the present study. We still find the general picture that Henry reported. When the child associates discipline more with father than with mother, he is more likely to report feeling angry at other children and adults both at home and in school, although he is not more likely to report feeling sad or frustrated and disturbed in general. Furthermore, the boys who report their fathers higher on discipline are rated by their teachers as higher on impulsivity, aggressiveness, and use of physical force as well as on initiation of friendships; and their peers report that they have high power. Tests using the mothers' reports of which parent disciplines tend to give us the same picture for the boys. The findings are similar for girls but not statistically significant.

In the present study, however, we did *not* find this pattern affected by which parent supplies affection or even by which parent is the one from whom the child most wants affection. The failure to replicate the findings of the pilot study may mean that the previous theoretical explanation is in-

valid, or that because the mother is typically the main nurturing agent, especially in the early years, she is the most crucial love object quite regardless of what the child tells us about the current situation.

However there is another somewhat similar explanation for the relationship between father discipline and turning hostility outward which now seems to have more empirical support: that is, that the crucial variable is the kind of discipline technique each parent tends to use. Allinsmith(1) has demonstrated that direct power-assertive discipline techniques lead to the tendency in children to express their aggression, while the softer discipline techniques lead to repression and guilt. Several recent studies(3, 6) have found that fathers use more direct power-assertive techniques whereas mothers more often soften their discipline with explanations or reassurances of love or use more love-oriented techniques in general. Therefore, when the father is the disciplinarian, it seems likely that children will become assertive and aggressive rather than repressed and intrapunitive because of the kinds of techniques fathers are more likely to use.

We should take note of the fact that the Henry studies and the Allinsmith study have used male subjects only, and in our own data the findings hold up mainly for boys. In the present study, the only relationship in this unit that is statistically significant for girls is the relationship between the child's perception of the father as disciplinarian and the report of feelings of anger. This, of course, is a very important relationship, and most of the other relationships, if not significant, are in the predicted direction. However, we are on much less certain grounds in extending this theory to include girls.

For one thing, a replication of the Allinsmith study with girls is needed. There is evidence from other analyses in our study that girls are more disturbed by the love-withdrawal aspects of a situation; and boys, by threats to autonomy. If this is so, then unqualified power assertion by the parent might evoke anger in boys because it is a threat to their autonomy needs, but to girls it might represent rejection. Thus the girls might feel anger less than boys and, because affectional ties are more important to girls, they would be more likely to repress any anger they did feel.

To add to the complications, there are data that even the objective situation is different for boys and girls. Studies by Bronfenbrenner(3) and by Hoffman and Saltzstein(7) indicate that parents, and especially fathers, use less power-assertive techniques with girls. Thus, for girls, the difference between father discipline and mother discipline may be less than it is for boys both objectively and subjectively.

Affection

The second unit I want to discuss deals with the father's affectional relationship with the child. For boys, we find that a warm companionship with the father is clearly related to peer-group adjustment. Positive affect and interaction with the mother does not show this same linear and un-

ambiguous relationship although it does relate to the boy's liking of other children and his being liked by them in return. A positive relationship with the father, however, relates not only to these variables but also to self-confidence, assertiveness, and skills in the peer group. From our data, it would appear that a mother's love and attention make a boy feel warm and cozy, but a father's equip him to face the world. For example, both lead to a feeling of being loved and accepted, but a positive father relationship is associated with a high degree of self-confidence with respect to abilities, while a positive relationship with the mother is associated with a low degree of self-confidence. In addition, only the warm interaction with the father is associated with an outgoing peer-group behavior pattern that includes initiation of friendships, frequent attempts at influence but low use of physical force, success in influence, and nondependency. It is also associated with athletic and intellectual ability and with a tendency to respond realistically and adaptively to frustrating situations. The relationship with the mother is not related to any of these variables.

As might be expected, the relationship with the father is less important in predicting the peer-group adjustment of girls although positive affect from the father does relate to feeling loved and accepted, and slightly to impulsivity and self-centeredness. With the girls, what mainly counts is affection from the mother, particularly when the girls themselves can initiate interaction with their mothers.

Again in explaining the sex differences we have the problem of interpreting whether it is the behavior of the parents which is different or the reaction of the child. It may be that parents are more indulgent with children of the opposite sex so that positive affect and interaction take on a different context. Bronfenbrenner's data(3) would support this interpretation. It is also likely that interaction with the same-sex parent is more functional to the child's developing the skills that are appropriate for his successful peer-group interaction. Furthermore, if mothers are more affectionate in general, it may be that a particularly close relationship with the mother is dysfunctional to the assertiveness and independence that boys are expected to display but is appropriate for the more affiliative behavior generally expected of girls.

The Child's Perception of Others

Lest it be concluded that the father is a relatively nonessential member of the family as far as a little girl is concerned, I would like to turn to the third unit of analysis. There are a great many theories about the parent as a model for the child's own behavior. However, parents also provide a pattern which the child generalizes to the world. Strodtbeck(12) uses such a theory in explaining his finding that high powered fathers often have sons who feel ineffective, who believe, for example, that "man is controlled by destiny." Since these sons are in a reciprocal relationship to a high powered

father, they are powerless in relation to him and generalize this powerlessness beyond the home.

Our analysis tests a different hypothesis but one which also assumes that the child generalizes from his relationship with his parents. Perhaps the primary status communicated to the child is that of sex, and it seems likely that, to the child, the father represents males in general and the mother, females. This should be particularly true for girls because sex is a more salient status for them. It might be expected, then, that the differences the child experiences in his relations with each parent will be generalized as differences between males and females. The child's perceptions of others, and his expectations of their behavior toward him, will be influenced by his relationship with his parents and, particularly for girls, this will be according to the person's sex. Thus, if father is more disciplining and coercive than mother, the child will perceive males as more coercive than females. The same prediction can be made for expertness, affection, and power.

In keeping with these notions, we found that children whose fathers were more disciplining than their mothers attributed higher coerciveness to boys than girls in their sociometric ratings. These relationships were significant for both boys and girls whether child perceptions of parent discipline or mothers' reports were used. For girls, we also found that if the father was seen as higher on instruction or expertness, boys were rated higher than girls on expertness. If the father was higher on positive affect and was the parent from whom the girl most wanted praise, girls liked boys more than girls. The boys showed these same tendencies, but to a lesser extent. The hypothesis was not confirmed for power; we have already mentioned that, for boys, the father's attitude is the important factor. To some extent, then, the father's role does influence the child's perception of others, and this is somewhat truer for girls than boys.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As independent variables, I have taken up the power and affectional relationship between the mother and father, and the father's disciplining and affectional relationship with the child. The dependent variables have been the child's peer-group behavior and other relevant variables. We should now be able to say what role for the father will lead to a good peer-group adjustment for the child. And yet we really cannot. For one thing, we are dealing with highs and lows on both independent and dependent variables when, in fact, relationships are rarely linear, and certainly our value judgments about what is a good adjustment are not linear. If father discipline leads to juvenile delinquency, and mother discipline leads to psychosomatic ailments, which is better?

I can sum up and say that, in this study, we found that when the father is more powerful than the mother, disciplines his children, and has a warm companionship with them, the boys—and to a lesser extent the girls—will

have self-confidence and feel accepted by others, show a positive assertiveness in the peer group, have skills, like others, be well liked, and exert influence. But before we can translate this into a prescription for fathers' behavior we need more research. We need to go into each relationship more carefully, not only to replicate it with other measures and samples but also to define the limiting conditions and to analyze the process that links the independent and dependent variables. We need to understand better the content of these interactions. And we need to gain insight about the omnipresent sex differences. I have reported data from one research project, and I hope it raises questions if it does not give answers.

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DISCUSSION

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A year ago, when looking for a suitable theme for this year's meeting, the Board of Directors of the International Council of Psychologists decided that it would be fitting if the meeting could constitute a contribution to the World Mental Health Year now under way. The general theme selected by the Board was "Childhood and Mental Health," and the program committee was charged with the responsibility for choosing a topic under this general heading and organizing a symposium. Since interest in a symposium on the role of the father grew out of our concern with mental health, it is in this context that I would like to discuss the papers that we have heard today.

Speculation vs. Evidence. Each of the speakers has cited previous studies pointing to the existence of a relationship between familial influence and the behavior patterns of the child, between parental role structure and the role assumed by the child in his peer group. Nevertheless, two of the speakers have suggested that empirical studies about the effects of parental role on the developing child have been relatively few, and that known facts fall far short of the data needed to confirm the hypotheses that have been offered and, too frequently, accepted as gospel without supporting evidence. I would certainly agree that, in this area, the collection and analysis of data have lagged far behind the process of speculating and hypothesizing. Theory has often been used as a substitute for fact by psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, social caseworkers, counselors, and others who are concerned in practical ways with effecting changes in behavior.

Father Role vs. Mother Role. A great deal of research has been done on the mother-child relationship, but much of this is of such a nature as to give the impression that the father does not exist, that he does not matter, or that his role will be studied and discussed by someone else at some other time. Many studies purporting to present data on parental role actually have either equated parental role with the role of the mother or have depicted the father as such a vague figure that few conclusions may be drawn concerning his role in the family.

The fact that investigators and theorists would rather focus on mothers than on fathers is revealed in the relative number of titles listed under *mother* and *father* in the index to *Psychological Abstracts.* In the abstracts indexed from 1955 through 1959, there are 202 titles listed under mother

and only 42 listed under father. Of the 42, more than half are either theoretical essays or limited exploratory presentations of clinical material. This is not to say that there is not much to be learned from these writings, nor does it imply that these are the only studies that have been made. Many books and articles of course have not been abstracted, and many studies containing valuable information about the influence of paternal role would not have been indexed under father. However, I think this discrepancy does point to a trend and supports the statements of the speakers concerning the state of our knowledge about the effect of family structure.

Interdisciplinary Approach. Reviewing the literature on the role of the father, I was struck by the fact that both research contributions and theoretical material have been offered by persons who represent a variety of disciplines, and their writings have been published not only in psychological journals but in psychiatric, sociological, anthropological, and social work periodicals as well as in books. This fact suggests that here, as in other areas of the behavioral sciences, we must draw on the ideas and research of various disciplines. This is certainly pointed out in the scope of the literature cited by our speakers, in the techniques used in their own research, and in the very professional identities of the speakers themselves. We find none of our speakers labeled as professor of psychology and none employed by a department of psychology although all are psychologists.

Multicausality. Each of the speakers, in contributing to our symposium on the influence of the father in the family setting, is reporting from an extensive research project which goes beyond the limits of the subject of this symposium. The nature of these projects and the findings reported suggest that we can delineate the ideal role of the father in relation to effective functioning of the child only if we consider many variables. These include the role assumed by the mother, the mother-father relationship, the specific subculture of which the family is a part, and the social class to which the family belongs. Thus we will have no easy answers for the clinicians, counselors, and parent education personnel.

Fathers and Sons. Another impression I get from these papers is that we have a more specific idea of the role of the father in relation to the behavior patterns of boys than in relation to those of girls. Each of our speakers has assured us that the role assumed by the father is related to the psychological functioning of both boys and girls, but it seems to me that the effect of the father-daughter relationship is considerably less clear than the effect of the father-son relationship.

Identification. As a clinician, I am impressed by the fact that all three papers have had contributions to make to understanding the processes and results of identification. Dr. Burton has used the term *identification*, but, in describing the socialization of the child, Dr. Hoffman and Dr. Bronfenbrenner have been talking about some of the same kinds of learning. A better

understanding of these processes seems a necessary precursor to effective action to solve some of our pressing problems such as juvenile delinquency.

Turning to the individual papers, I would like to make a few comments and raise some questions suggested by each. In Dr. Bronfenbrenner's presentation, he has suggested that changes in the roles of mother and father are being reflected in changes in the behavior patterns of children. He has pointed out (a) that there is a curvilinear relationship between parental affection or authority on the one hand and child behavior on the other; (b) that the optimal level of affection and authority is different for the two sexes; (c) that the optimal level of authority occurs earlier at the upper than at the lower socioeconomic levels because of different methods of child rearing; (d) that the maximum, or point of diminishing returns, for support and discipline will vary systematically as a function of the sex of child, sex of parents, and the family's social position; and (e) that fathers are particularly important for the socialization of boys.

From the standpoint of any psychologist functioning in a clinical or parent education setting, the facts that boys and girls have varying needs and that they run different risks in the socialization process depending on social level are quite important.

Dr. Bronfenbrenner states that the "love-oriented" socialization techniques, while fostering the internalization of adult standards, may also have the effect of undermining the capacity for initiative and independence in boys. It is a common observation of clinicians that the greater permissiveness displayed in child-rearing practices often involves insufficient setting of limits, with resulting anxiety on the part of the child who is concerned about limits and controls. I wonder if sometimes failure on the part of the child to develop initiative and independence is due to the fear of venturing forth into a dangerous situation where there are no warning signs or fences. Or is it due sometimes to lack of motivation because nothing has been withheld? Perhaps a lack of "status envy" comes into the situation.

There are two questions which I would like to ask Dr. Bronfenbrenner. The first has to do with the curvilinear relationships discussed. Can it be that the curvilinearity is due in part to qualitative differences at the extremes? For example, can it be that overprotection at the extreme has the same effect as underprotection because the former so frequently represents a reaction formation, and the rejection aspects, rather than the love aspects, somehow are communicated to the child?

My second question relates to the so-called "equalitarian" home which has a deleterious effect on the child. Is this equalitarian home a home in which there is lack of sex-role differentiation rather than the kind of equalitarian home in which each sex is valued for its unique characteristics?

Dr. Burton has given us a very stimulating and provocative presentation of Dr. Whiting's status envy theory of identification, and the material which he cites from anthropological studies perhaps throws light on some of the important problems with which we are faced today. The studies he reports and the description of his own research design point up the necessity of a cross-disciplinary and multifaceted approach in studying the effects of family structure and in understanding the social problems with which it is associated.

Many people have been in favor of stable and intact families but maybe have not always known why. Dr. Burton's statement that children from nuclear households are more mature than those from mother-child households fits in with the findings of Lourie, Millican, and Layman(3), who studied factors related to certain types of immature behavior in children from lower-class homes in a large metropolitan area. In analyzing the family structure of children presenting immature patterns such as continuance of infantile hand-to-mouth activity beyond the point where this is considered developmentally normal, they found that fathers were absent with significantly greater frequency from the homes of the children with infantile oral habits than from the homes of children who did not have these habits. The figures showed that, for the children with infantile oral habits, 46 per cent came from homes without fathers; and for those presenting emotional and behavior problems other than those involving oral activity, 40 per cent came from fatherless homes. For those from a comparable cultural and socioeconomic group who were normal in the sense that they had never been referred to a psychiatric clinic, 30 per cent came from mother-child households.

I would be interested in the comments of Dr. Burton and/or Dr. Bronfenbrenner about the effect on the child of the type of culture in which the father is involved in a relationship with the child but has little status in the society. I am thinking, for example, of the status of the middle-class Negro father in the south. Frazier, in *Black Bourgeoisie*, states: "In the south the Negro male is not only prevented from playing a masculine role, but generally he must let Negro women assume leadership in any show of militancy"(1, p. 221). In such a culture the male would seem to have an unenviable status and to provide the type of model which is usually associated with femininity. And what happens when an individual who has grown up in such a matriarchy moves to a locality where sex role expectations are different?

Dr. Burton has stated that, in the status envy hypothesis, identification with the aggressor and the Oedipal conflict are special cases. I wonder how he feels about the suggestion of Lair(2) and Mowrer(4) that there are two kinds of identification, designated as developmental identification and defensive identification, and how these would fit in with the status envy hypothesis.

Dr. Hoffman's paper seems to spell out in terms of specifics some of the more general findings or ideas presented by Dr. Bronfenbrenner and Dr. Burton. She points out that a warm companionship with the father and a situation in which the mother handles the routine child care activities will lead both boys and girls to a like-sex identification. She also indicates that a warm relationship with the father is clearly associated with good peer adjustment, especially in boys. Her breaking down of parental relationships into power and affectional components, and father-child relationships into disciplining and affectional components has certainly helped to clarify the picture of the relation between family interaction patterns and peer adjustment even though it has not given us all the answers.

Dr. Hoffman's work raises many provocative questions, but I shall confine my questions to two: Why is the parental power relationship more important for boys and the affectional relationship for girls, and why does the father's role influence the girl's perception of others more than it influences the boy's perception of others?

SUMMARY

Considering these three papers, I find they all show quite clearly that the role of the father is of great importance in terms of family dynamics and its effect on the child. I agree with the speakers that it will be necessary to do much more research before we can really have a definitive picture, and I think that this research will have to include more direct studies of fathers themselves, with perhaps less exclusive reliance on perceptions of fathers by mothers and children. However, although as Dr. Hoffman says, at this point we do not have the answers and thus cannot write a prescription for good fatherhood, at least we are clarifying the concept of what shifting family patterns are doing to children and we know some of the areas in which we will have to look for our answers. And, as Dr. Burton suggests, we may have something which will contribute to solving some of our most perplexing social problems of today.

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TOWARD A DUALISTIC THEORY OF IDENTIFICATION

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During the past several years a number of attempts have been made to clarify the concept of identification, the portmanteau character of which has long been recognized. Some have sought to narrow the range of application of the term(35), some to trace the theoretical roots of the different usages(23), some to demonstrate the different relationships obtained with different measures(5).

The purpose of this paper is (a) to achieve a clearer discrimination between the two principal types of identification, (b) to explore the functional relationship between them, and (c) to reappraise some of the findings regarding the relationship between identification and personality development in the light of these two concepts.

Since there is some value in preserving the term identification as a broad concept embracing both of the types to be discussed, our definition of the term will be a minimal one. Identification here denotes any tendency for an individual to seek to maximize his similarity to another person in one or more respects.

PERSONAL AND POSITIONAL IDENTIFICATION

Personal identification is so designated because it involves the identification of ego with the actual person of alter—the adoption of his personality traits, values, and attitudes, even his view of ego. It is motivated primarily by ego's love and admiration for alter. The child who identifies in this way with a parent is saying, in effect: "I want to be like you. If I were, I would have you (and your virtues) with me all the time, and I would love myself as much as I love you. To achieve this I will incorporate your qualities and your values and ideals. I will view and judge myself through your eyes."

Positional identification involves the identification of ego with the situation or role of alter. There is no empathic understanding of alter but merely a putting of oneself in fantasy into the situation of alter and acting out the appropriate role. It is motivated not by love but by envy and fear. The child who identifies with a parent in this way is saying, in effect: "I wish I were in your shoes. If I were, I would not be in the unpleasant position I am in now. If I wish hard enough and act like you do, I may after all

achieve your more advantageous status." This situational improvement is of two kinds: (a) "I would be strong and powerful rather than weak and helpless, menacing rather than menaced, punishing rather than punished"; (b) "Mother (Father) would love me rather than you."

The uncompromising all-or-nothing quality of these desires expresses their unconscious, fantastic basis. We recognize in (a) the familiar mechanism of identification with the aggressor and in (b) the classical Oedipal wish. In neither case is there any necessity for the genuine internalization of parental values or for positive cathexis of alter. Both types of positional identification involve the destruction and replacement of alter, an outcome which is not desired in personal identification.

Historically, this distinction has been roughly coterminous with the boundary between psychoanalytic and nonpsychoanalytic schools of thought —the psychoanalysts primarily concerned with the dynamics of positional identification, and social psychologists involved in carrying out research on personal identification.

IDENTIFICATION AND OBJECT CHOICE

One key to this confusion and to the distinction between personal and positional identification is the relationship between identification and object choice. "It is easy," according to Freud, "to state in a formula the distinction between an identification with the father and the choice of the father as an object. In the first case one's father is what one would like to *be,* and in the second he is what one would like to *have*"(15, p. 62). This formula has a pleasing simplicity but tends to lead by degrees to an exaggeration of the distinction to the point where many people assume a negative relationship between the two. Freud himself speaks of the *ambivalence* of identification(15, p. 61), and seems to have been aware that perhaps more than one process could be subsumed under the term, although his attempts to deal with these complexities are rather confused(15, pp. 60-80; 13, pp. 34-42). In a later work, however, he states flatly that "identification and object-choice are broadly speaking independent of each other," that not only can they occur at once, but that some identifications are "precipitates of abandoned object cathexes"(14, pp. 86-87).

Certainly there is no contradiction between identification and object choice in the minds of preadolescent children. The self-conscious hypermasculinity of boys in the latency period is challenged by mere feminine contact, as if association with, and interest in, girls would be feminizing by contagion. The child who violates this cross-sex taboo, moreover, is often teased by being called by the name of the girl with whom he is enamored, as if by liking her he had identified himself with her. This phenomenon is in sharp contrast with identification with the aggressor, in which the cathexis is often altogether negative.

The distinction between personal and positional identification is derived from this independence of identification and object choice. Personal identification may be defined as identification based upon positive cathexis of the object, and positional identification as identification based upon negative cathexis of the object.

IDENTIFICATION AND INTERNALIZATION

Freud died dissatisfied with his formulation(14, p. 86) and left the door open for further clarification. This state of affairs, however, was ended by Fenichel(11, pp. 104-105), who has often served, intentionally or unintentionally, as a kind of impatient croupier with respect to psychoanalytic theory. By freezing on the hostile, destructive form and ignoring the more affectionate brand of identification, Fenichel saw to it that the psychoanalytic definition of identification which has come down to us is almost entirely positional. The picture is complicated, however, by the inclusion in this formulation of an association between identification and the internalization of parental values, a process which we have referred exclusively to personal identification. In terms of the theory offered here, this is a serious error. Empirical studies have found repeatedly that such internalization is found in conjunction with warm and affectionate, rather than chronically frustrating, parents(10, pp. 684-685; 20; 37). Personal identification appears to be merely an intervening variable in the close correlation between parental supportiveness and internalization of parental values.

Anna Freud's discussion of identification with the aggressor is more specific regarding the relationship between positional identification and internalization. She first underlines the positional character of identification with the aggressor by noting, in relation to a child who had been hurt by a dentist and vented his feelings on objects about him, that "there was no actual impersonation of the dentist. The child was identifying himself not with the person of the aggressor but with his aggression"(12, p. 120). She then argues that this type of positional identification is a step in the direction of internalization, inasmuch as the punitive attitude is taken in, although it is redirected outward rather than turned upon the self. "True morality begins when the internalized criticism . . . coincides with the ego's perception of its own fault"(12, pp. 124-128). There are no grounds, however, for propounding a sequence here. So long as the punitive attitude is directed outward we are unjustified in saying that any viewpoint has been taken in. It is not the viewpoint of the dentist which is adopted, but the immensely more favorable power position in which he stands relative to the frightened child anticipating punishment. This view is shared by Sanford, who argues that this type of identification does not produce any lasting internalized structures in the personality(35, pp. 112-114).

We would argue that positional identification, rather than being a step in the direction of personal identification, tends to occur insofar as personal

identification fails to develop.[1] Before elaborating this argument, however, we will review briefly the relationship of these two types of identification to distinctions made by other authors.

RELATIONSHIPS TO OTHER IDENTIFICATION CONCEPTS

Although it is not elaborated conceptually, Redl distinguishes clinically between identification through love and identification through fear(32), a distinction which is preserved in the definitions of personal and positional identification.

Some identification theorists have attempted to limit the term to positional identification, arguing that the phenomena involved in what we have called personal identification should be assigned other labels(35, 45). So violent a reversal of decades of usage, however, seems unnecessarily awkward if another solution can be found. In other respects Sanford's position accords well with the one taken here. His "identification proper" (a form of positional identification) is seen as defensive and maladaptive, and he argues that under some conditions it is not only a substitute for, but a way of avoiding, the kind of internalization of standards we have called personal. He also contrasts the slow selective adoption and adaptation of traits which occur in what we would call personal identification, with the literal detailed adoption of traits in "identification proper"(35).

This raises a question we have heretofore ignored. The definition of positional identification offered above makes no mention of the adoption of specific characteristics of the model, and in general we would associate a sought similarity in personality with personal identification. An exception to this rule would be any traits expressing directly or symbolically the position desired by the person who identifies. In the therapy situation, which Sanford discusses, positional identification would be exemplified by the imitation of some nervous mannerism of the therapist, which would express

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[1]Assuming, of course, that we hold constant any general capacity of the model for attracting identification. When all variables are considered together, the two types of identification are necessarily independent, not inversely related, since we have posited a two-dimensional system comprising a general identification dimension and a bipolar dimension of positive vs. negative object choice. Personal and positional identification, orthogonal to each other, should be seen as intersecting these primary dimensions at an angle of 45°.

This is important to remember, since the model, whether loved or hated, may be so ineffectual, colorless, and insubstantial as not to attract identification of either type. The general factor, then, will determine whether the model provokes intense ambivalence or utter indifference, while the bipolar factor will determine whether the reaction is primarily positive or negative. Since we are holding the general factor constant for simplicity of presentation, the valence factor is predominant, and the two types of identification will *under these conditions* be inversely related. In real life, however, we would often expect to find both kinds of identification occurring together.

the desire of the patient to be in the superior status position of the therapist whose tics do not have to be analyzed and interpreted. This is, like the forms of resistance Sanford cites(cf. 1, pp. 305-308), a way of avoiding a personal identification with the therapist, i.e., internalizing such traits as insight, objectivity, and concern for others, and adopting his viewpoint toward the patient.

With regard to personal traits, then, apart from values, standards, attitudes, etc., we would say that in positional identification only a few characteristics of the model will be adopted—those which symbolize the model's desired position—but that these will be very literally copied, as in Freud's example of the sergeant who imitates the way the general clears his throat and spits(15, pp. 110-111). In personal identification a wide range of characteristics of the model will be adopted, but with substantial modifications, since, as Sanford says, the individual "puts his own stamp" on them(35, p. 110).

It is clear from this that it is far easier to develop operational definitions of personal than of positional identification. In the former case we need only some measure of the range of similar characteristics, while in the latter we must first determine, for each individual case, which traits involve the relevant symbolic equations. To my knowledge, there exists at present no adequate empirical measure of positional identification, although Leary's "preconscious identification," which stresses the fantasy adoption of an interpersonal mode, seems close to what we are seeking(26). On the other hand, a considerable number of studies have used as a measure the similarity between the way in which a subject describes himself on a questionnaire and the way in which he describes his parents (or they describe themselves) on the same questionnaire (4, 5, 7, 9, 19, 21, 22, 27, 31, 39, 40). These would seem appropriate operational definitions of personal identification inasmuch as they tap a generalized similarity over a large number of characteristics, such as would be achieved only by years of striving to approximate a loved object. In at least one instance, furthermore, the criterial positive relationship to object choice was demonstrated(22).

While we cannot attempt to examine the many theoretical analyses which have been made of the concept of identification, we should note the distinction between "defensive" and "developmental" identification suggested by Lair(24) and expanded by Mowrer(29, pp. 590-592). These terms seem to correspond very closely to positional and personal identification, respectively.[2] Mowrer notes, e.g., that developmental identification is less crisis-like than defensive identification and that the former seems to

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[2]Each rereading of Mowrer's discussion tends to convince me further that we are talking about the same distinction. I have nonetheless retained my own terms to avoid possibly introducing confusion into the understanding of his. Should my surmise prove correct, however, I hold no special brief for the terms I have used. Lair's terms are equally descriptive of the phenomena with which I am trying to deal.

be more concerned with parental love and less concerned with fear than the latter.

Perhaps the most useful criterial definition is suggested by Kagan's statement(23, pp. 298-299) that objects will be identified with to the degree to which they command the desired goal states of the subject. We might rephrase the distinction between personal and positional identification by saying that insofar as this command is a function of desired qualities inherent in the personality of the model, the identification is personal, while insofar as it is a function of the desired role or situation in which the model finds himself, the identification is positional.

One might object here that punitiveness and hostility—traits which we have associated with positional identification—might be viewed as "desired qualities inherent in the personality of the model," and thus contradict the distinction we have made. But it is not the punitiveness and hostility which are desired in an identification with the aggressor (they may already be amply present in the subject) but the ability to express them behaviorally.

ANTECEDENTS OF PERSONAL AND POSITIONAL IDENTIFICATION

We may now carry the distinction between personal and positional identification into the area of antecedents and suggest that while the former tends to occur as a consequence of parental warmth and supportiveness, the latter is more likely to result from the absence of these qualities in the parent's behavior toward the child. Positional identification, then, will occur insofar as personal identification has failed to occur. This formulation resolves the discrepancy between Fenichel's dictum that identification is a function of frustrating parental behavior(11, p. 104) and empirical studies showing a high correlation between gratifying parental behavior and identification(19, 20, 31, 36, 39, 41, 44) and a negative correlation between parental punitiveness and identification(10, 20, 41; cf. also 38). Given the distinction we have made, Fenichel's statement becomes a logical consequence, rather than a contradiction, of the empirical results.

A caution is necessary here. When we speak of warm or frustrating parents we are referring to diffuse parental attitudes rather than specific techniques of socialization. The disciplinary technique called withdrawal of love may be "frustrating behavior" but not in the generally punitive sense that Fenichel means, since it typically occurs within the context of a warm and supportive relationship. (It is presumably for this reason that it is designated a "love-oriented" technique.) The child of loving parents can increase or decrease the affection he receives by accepting or resisting parental demands, but he knows he is loved, and his personal identification is based, I would suggest, on this love rather than on the technique. The child of harsh parents, on the other hand, knows that he will continue to be rejected no matter what he does, so long as he remains himself. Positional identification is in part an attempt to escape this latter condition.

In a similar vein, Mowrer makes a statement about Lair's two forms of identification which is equally relevant here:

> It is true that in both developmental and defensive identification the subject is "frustrated," but the different nature of the frustration in the two instances is noteworthy. In the one case it arises from a sense of helplessness and loneliness: The parent or parent-person is *absent*, and the infant wishes he were *present*. In the other case, the frustration arises rather from interference and punishment: The parent or parent-person is *present*, and the infant wishes he were *absent* (29, p. 592).

MATERNAL AND PATERNAL IDENTIFICATION

Thus far we have made no distinction between paternal and maternal identification. Yet Fenichel's dictum is actually stated in terms of "which parent" the child identifies with. This assumes that (a) identification is an all-or-none proposition, and (b) identification with one parent precludes identification with the other; neither of which assumptions can be justified by appeal to research findings, clinical experience, or even conceptual elegance (cf. 6, p. 223; 23, p. 304). When measured independently and correlated (as they rarely are), paternal and maternal identification are strongly and positively related (39), which suggests that those researchers who, following Fenichel, have operationally defined identification in preferential, either-or terms are dealing with measures which are not, statistically, very meaningful (cf. 4, 5, 22, 31, 39).[3]

This either-or view of the matter has led to considerable confusion whenever an attempt has been made to correlate identification with adjustment measures of various kinds. When a preferential measure is used, the correlation naturally approximates zero (cf. 4). When paternal and maternal identification are measured independently, they usually correlate (always, for boys) with the adjustment measure in the same direction—a result we would expect from the high correlation between the two identification measures (25, 27, 39, 40), but one which seems to contradict the psychoanalytic assumption that cross-sex identification is maladaptive (11, p. 335; cf. also 29, p. 599). The apparent contradiction arises from the fact that the measures used are in all cases measures of personal identification, while the sexual and emotional maladjustment associated with cross-sex parental identification pertains solely to positional identification. There is nothing in the description of personal identification given above which would imply the adoption of the wrong sex role if it concerned the opposite-sex parent (cf. 22; 25; 29, p. 608).

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[3]Such a measure must be used, however, to make a direct test of Fenichel's statement. In studies where this was done the results were of the same order: The child identifies, preferentially, with whichever parent is seen as more warm and supportive (31; 39, p. 119).

The correlation between paternal and maternal personal identification suggests the possibility that if they occur consecutively, rather than simultaneously, one may facilitate the other. The fact that both correlate positively with adjustment argues that each is a necessary step in the process of normal development. The question now to be considered is whether or not there is any temporal or qualitative differentiation between maternal and paternal identification.

Such a differentiation is proposed by Parsons, who sees the development of the child as one involving a series of identifications, with maternal identification being the first for both sexes (30, pp. 91-94; cf. also 23, p. 302; 29, p. 608; 36; 37). Psychoanalytic theory also postulates a "primary identification" with the mother, although this could hardly be called personal identification as we have defined it (11, p. 37). That maternal identification should take precedence is argued by the greater contact between mother and child during the early years and the amount of time the father is away from the home. It is implicit in the findings of some researchers (18, 36) that identification with the father occurs through the mother, i.e., is dependent upon the mother's attitude toward the father. From this viewpoint it is difficult to see how paternal identification could take place at all without a substantial degree of prior maternal identification.

This primacy of maternal identification is consistent with the generally accepted idea that the most serious psychological disorders, such as schizophrenia, involve a profound disturbance in the mother-child relationship, with the etiological role of the father being less significant (3, 17, 34, 43). It is unlikely that maternal identification has in itself any prophylactic value, but the maternal warmth, nurturance, and affection which seem necessary for the development of personal identification are either absent or severely distorted in the disorders referred to, so that it is reasonable to propose a close association between the two. We may hypothesize that the degree of personal identification with the mother, by a child of either sex, is a variable which will discriminate sharply between schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics.

Paternal identification, on the other hand, would be significant primarily in connection with issues involved in a later stage of development. As Stoke points out, in orthodox psychoanalytic thinking it is inseparable from the Oedipal situation (41, p. 164), and we would expect a failure of personal paternal identification to be most strongly associated, for both sexes, with neurotic disturbances. Adequate sexual adjustment cannot take place unless the child of either sex develops an understanding and appreciation for masculine as well as feminine attitudes, interests, and characteristics. This will occur insofar as the father is warm and affectionate and provides an effective alternative source of emotional support for the child (cf. 31, 36, 39, 41). It will not occur if the father is too harsh, too withdrawn, or too ineffectual to provide such support.

POSITIONAL FANTASIES

It has been argued that positional identification results from a failure of personal identification. It has also been stated that personal identification with a parent need not involve the adoption of the sex role of that parent, and that maternal and paternal personal identification are positively correlated. We must now ask if this correlation holds for positional identification, in which the identification process is so directly concerned with sex roles.

Logically, positional identification with one parent is incompatible with positional identification with the other parent. One cannot destroy and replace the father in order to possess the mother and then turn around and destroy the mother and possess the father. But the principal appeal of fantasy is its ability to dispense with considerations of this kind. In the unconscious, contradictions can exist side by side. Another characteristic of primary process is the all-or-none quality of its products. There is no subtle integrative way of handling ambivalences and contradictions. As in dream formation, the opposing ideas are simply presented one after the other in their raw form.

Since failure of paternal personal identification is generally associated with a similar failure of maternal personal identification, it would be unusual for one of the twin positional fantasies to occur without the other. The standard Oedipal fantasy alone, e.g., fails to handle the hostile feelings toward the mother, while it eliminates the father, an alternative source of support. Its "reverse Oedipal" twin is therefore required to rectify the imbalance. Insofar as there is a deficit of warmth and supportiveness in the family the child will both demand it from everyone and feel resentful of everyone. The greater the deficit, the more uncompromising will both of these contradictory feelings become. This is perhaps another way of saying that the central discomfort of the Oedipal situation for the child is one of being left out or excluded from a loving relationship.

Freud seemed to be aware of this problem in some of his later works (13, pp. 42-43; 16, p. 188), although it has been largely ignored by his followers. In *The Ego and the Id* he speaks of the "complete Oedipus complex" in these terms: "a boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude towards his father and an affectionate object-relation towards his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and displays an affectionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding hostility and jealousy towards his mother." Freud further states that "in my opinion it is advisable in general, and quite especially where neurotics are concerned, to assume the existence of the complete Oedipus complex." As this complex "dissolves, the four trends of which it consists will group themselves in such a way as to produce a father-identification and a mother-identification," which together constitute the ego-ideal(13, pp. 43-44). This seems to be another way of saying that if the neurotic process can be reversed, the twin posi-

tional fantasies will be exchanged for a personal identification with both parents.

This is not to say that one fantasy may not predominate. It is likely in any case that one will be more conscious than the other, and the degree to which either will erupt into overt behavior will depend upon other factors. Clinical discussions of the authoritarian personality exemplify this issue(2). Submissive authoritarians are often said to "identify" with strong masculine authority figures, despite an unconscious "feminine identification." Both identifications are positional, but the "feminine" identification, which is typically unconscious, is expressed more often in behavior, since this type of person usually seeks positions in which he will be in a dependent, protected role vis-a-vis some authority. The "masculine" identification, on the other hand, while acutely conscious and rather exaggerated, is seldom expressed in overt behavior unless environmental props of sufficient strength are present(cf. 35, p. 112).

CROSS-SEX PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION

The idea that cross-sex parental identification is associated with homosexuality is basic to psychoanalytic theory(11, p. 335), and there is no doubt of the salience of cross-sex positional fantasies in many persons with homosexual problems. This clinical salience, however, has been misleading in three respects. First, as already noted, it has distracted attention from the frequency with which this fantasy is paired with its conventional Oedipal twin. Second, it has led theorists to view identification as a causal factor in homosexuality. Third, it has led psychologists to overlook the apparent *negative* relationship between cross-sex personal identification and homosexuality.[4]

The notion that cross-sex positional identification is etiologically important in the development of homosexual patterns leads to manifest absurdities. It has often been found, for example, that the mothers of feminine or homosexual males tend to be masculine, dominant, and aggressive(4; 29, p. 599; 31). Yet Symonds, referring to this relationship, goes on to say that the homosexual male "identifies" with his mother and "takes on feminine ways"(42, p. 96). Perhaps a great deal of confusion would be eliminated were we to recognize the possibility that (a) the positional fantasies do not involve any realistic adoption of parental characteristics, and (b) the fantasies and the homosexuality are both offshoots of pathogenic interpersonal pressures in the family situation and are not causally related to each other.

The data with regard to the negative relationship between homosexual development and cross-sex personal identification are quite clear. Not only does a high degree of such identification occur with great regularity among

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[4]Insofar as a masculinity-femininity scale or similar instrument can be said to measure homosexual tendencies.

normal subjects(4, 6, 22, 25, 27, 33), despite Fenichel's statement that it cannot(11, p. 104); but also in those instances in which a direct test was made, significant negative correlations have been obtained(39, 40). In part we would expect this simply as an expression of the positive relationship found between personal identification with either parent and general adjustment(cf., 8, 9, 25, 27, 39, 40).[5] According to this view, it makes very little difference, for sex role adoption, which parent the child identifies with most(cf. 4). An adequate personal identification with both parents presupposes a satisfactory climate for making the correct choice, and the choice itself will be made through the internalization of cultural norms held by both parents.

Yet the idea that cross-sex identification of any kind would facilitate heterosexual adjustment is perhaps novel enough to require further interpretation. Brodbeck(6) found that cross-sex identification in normal children actually increases with age, a finding which suggests some positive developmental function. First, it might be said that ability to relate in a satisfactory way to the opposite sex is a function not only of one's own sexual role but also of an ability to accept, emotionally, the complementary role. This is the process described by Mead(28) as "taking the role of the other." It is perhaps made more difficult by the fact that in all cultures the sexes, especially as children, are segregated in so many of their activities, so that most of the learning must take place in the family. Without this empathy, apparent acceptance of the appropriate sex role may go together with homosexuality and fear of the opposite sex, as in patriarchal Greece of the classical period.

This issue is of particular importance for the female child, since the father is a more remote and hence more difficult object of identification for her than is the mother for the male child. This greater difficulty of cross-sex identification for the girl is manifested in Sears' finding that whereas preschool boys use mother and father dolls equally in doll play, girls use the mother doll predominantly(36). This would suggest that the mother's attitude may be particularly important in facilitating paternal identification in the young girl. If she convinces the girl that men are to be feared or despised, and the father does nothing to contradict this image, the girl will be totally unable to understand or tolerate masculine attitudes. While her orientation may be decidedly, or even exaggeratedly, "feminine," she will lack the normal spontaneity and seductiveness which result from an adequate paternal relationship and which attest to a satisfactory heterosexual adjustment. Further, her identification with the mother will become overdetermined once this circumscription takes place, a factor which might account for the findings by at least three researchers that personal maternal

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[5]The last four studies cited test cross-sex identification as well as same-sex identification. In all four cases, the positive relationship with adjustment is as great or greater for the former.

identification in populations of nonpsychotic girls is not correlated with adjustment, unlike its other three counterparts (21, 25, 40). These are issues, however, about which we can only speculate at the present time.

SUMMARY

An attempt has been made to resolve some of the contradictions between experimental findings, clinical experience, and psychoanalytic theory with regard to the problem of parental identification. To this end a distinction was established between "personal" and "positional" identification, leading to the following general propositions:

1. Personal identification is a function of parental warmth, affection, and supportiveness.

2. Positional identification is a defensive reaction to gross frustration of the need for parental warmth, affection, and supportiveness.

3. Maternal and paternal personal identification are positively correlated, the former facilitating the latter.

4. Paternal and maternal positional identification fantasies are positively correlated, although logically contradictory. Whereas in personal identification, gaining the love of the object and being like the object may be simultaneously achieved, in positional identification they are incompatible, so that each of the twin fantasies fails to resolve one of these goals with both parents. Hence both fantasies must be entertained, although both need not be conscious and both need not be expressed behaviorally.

5. Personal identification with both parents is associated with general psychological health.

6. Cross-sex personal identification facilitates adoption of appropriate sex role.

So far as the author is aware, this formulation does not contradict any empirical finding dealing with the antecedents and correlates of identification, nor does it, on the other hand, close the door to eventual quantitative confirmation of the complex and subtle processes which have been hypothesized on the basis of clinical psychoanalytic experience.

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THE SOCIAL DIALECTIC OF PRODUCTIVE NONCONFORMITY [1]

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This paper examines some of the problems and possibilities, both definitional and empirical, presented by a study in the social reconciliation of opposites—an investigation, now in progress, of behavior called "productive nonconformity."

The research takes place, as certainly does this symposium, under the pervasive auspices of the *Zeitgeist* and the *Ortgeist* of contemporary America. With the professional interest we share in man and his social predicament, we are all overly aware of the widespread viewing-with-alarm of our present condition as an "age of conformity." The prototypic "status seeker," the "other directed" "organization man," is dismally described as swathed in gray flannel, submerged in "togetherness," lost in "group think," victimized by "hidden persuaders," or wandering lonely in a crowd. At the same time we are reminded that we also live in an "age of anxiety," fraught with major change and awful uncertainty. We are exhorted to "reconsider individualism," to develop "originality" and "creativity," to give recognition to the "uncommon man," and to strive toward a "maximum utilization of our human resources." If it is bad to be a "conformist," it is no better to be a "beatnik" or an "outsider." On a recent midnight, the voice of a radio disc jockey, like that of the raven, intruded abruptly upon my work: "Are you *tired* of being a conformist?" he asked. "Do you want to be a *leader* in your community? Be the *first in your neighborhood* to build a *fall-out shelter!*" In a search for other possible alternatives to conformity, efforts at clarification are not made easier by the semantic confusion with which the current hubbub is rife. But the catch phrases just recited do allude to a welter of problems as complex as they are fuzzily defined.

Before adding unnecessarily to the accretion of jargon, and because the terms "nonconformity" and "productivity" both have been so variously and ambiguously defined, it is important to make clear at once what is meant

by them here. *First of all, nonconformity is defined as individual behavior that, when viewed over time, is in both an observed statistical sense and an inferred psychological sense independent of the prevailing social norms. Secondly, productive nonconformity is independence that also can be shown to contribute to the task accomplishment of a particular group, organization, or society, or of an individual viewed in a particular social setting.*

The notion of nonconformity as independent behavior means that theoretically the statistical association between (a) the task-relevant behavior of an individual and (b) the behavior specified by the relevant social norm approaches zero as a limit (of individual autonomy) with a large N of behaviors sampled over time. Both consistently rebellious behavior ("negative conformity") and consistently compliant behavior ("positive conformity") are definitionally regarded as illustrations of conformity, since both types of habitual responses are assumed to be predictable with better than chance accuracy from knowledge of the group standards alone. (That is, a correlation of -1 permits as accurate a prediction as a correlation of $+1$.) Previous experimental research on conformity has frequently equated consistent opposition to the group with so-called independence(1, 6). As an alternative to consistent agreement with a majority position, the behavior referred to here is not that of the persistent "aginner." The concept of reaction formation provides one way to explain that kind of response to group influence. (It may be noted in passing that a recent study by Couch and Keniston failed to differentiate extreme "naysayers" and "yeasayers" in either "conventionality of outlook" or in "strength of super-ego"[5].)

Application of the *statistical criterion* of independence implies that a measure of individual behavior involves repeated sampling, that whether a single behavioral instance constitutes independence or conformity is indeterminate, and admits the possibility that an erroneous inference may be drawn about the direction or extent of conformity if the sample of observations is small or biased. It is compatible with noncomformity in this sense, therefore, that a person may or may not on any one occasion decide to go along with the group. Application of the *psychological criterion* of independence demands inference from evidence other than such statistical association that the actor's behavior is determined, not by a group standard, but by such antecedents as his own personal standards and the requirements of the task he faces. The concept of independence or nonconformity should be understood as relative, both to the situation and in degree. Some individuals are to be regarded as more or less conforming than others in that a greater or smaller proportion of the variability in their observed behavior over time is to be accounted for by the stipulations of the relevant social norms.

The notion of productivity as an amount of task accomplishment presumes that an actor's and a group's performance can be meaningfully sub-

jected to assessment, either by an external observer or by the actor's peers or superiors within a given social system. *The term "task" refers to the confrontation of an individual or a group with a stimulus situation in which the individual or the group is held accountable for some outcome such that his or their behavior is subject to assessment against specifiable criteria.* Task as defined by an observer may or may not correspond to an individual's or a group's "problem" as defined and responded to by the individual himself or by the group members (21). It is not to be assumed without independent evidence that a subject's task and his problem are phenomenally equivalent for him. The above definition of a task allows for as broad an example as "getting a college education" and does *not* equate outcome with tangible products like shoes. A measurable outcome might be "number of original ideas." On the other hand, while "creativity" may be included in, it is *not* synonymous with, productive nonconformity as presently defined; e.g., task solution may be accomplished through independent selection among alternatives, *all* of which are presently known, but only one of which is prescribed by established precedent.

An important restriction upon the present research is that it confines itself to questions about the assessment of independent behavior by the actor's contemporaries. This study does not include the present assessment of remote past events, nor can it preclude future revisions of present social— or even expert—judgments, which are notoriously subject to revision or reversal in the long view. The general concept of productivity as task accomplishment does assume that achievement orientation is a stable and predominant American characteristic (18). Definitions of tasks and criteria of task accomplishment, however, are expected to vary from situation to situation, from time to time, and from person to person (20).

We come now to face the dialectical problem: How *can* behavior that does not conform to standards against which it is subject to assessment still be assessed as of value? This *koan* must be answered on both theoretical and empirical levels. Unless the contradiction is resolved, the research enterprize has clinical and sociological significance solely as a projection in itself of the autistic dream of the alienated intellectual who would have his social cake and eat it, too. If nonconformity and productivity are initially given as disjoint or mutually exclusive categories, then productive nonconformity is by definition an impossible event, and there the argument ends. If, instead, we begin with a provisional assumption that nonconformity and productivity can be constituted as overlapping behavioral categories, we must state first just how conceptual reconciliation can be effected. Then the way is open and the impetus provided to inquire further into what becomes an empirical matter.

In brief, the reconciliation of the definitional paradox occurs, not in the formal rationality of the observer, but in the apparent illogicality of human behavior as observed in everyday life and with which it is pre-

cisely the problem of this investigation to deal. A central assumption by the observer is that a group or an organization or a society fluctuates in its rationality over time. This means that while the norm remains in force as a general set of injunctions, a different set of standards may be instituted on an *ad hoc* basis, or a different interpretation may be given to the general rule in the special instance.

What we want to find out is how does it happen that the behavior of a particular individual is regarded as an acceptable exception to the social rule? What are the circumstances under which the standard rules are temporarily suspended, or under which a special immunity from negative social sanction is granted? What are the extenuating conditions that determine whether, *and by whom*, in the process of assessment, permission will be granted or refused to treat the individual as a special case? Or—in a terse and familiar version—"how do you beat the system?"

With such general questions behind it, this research has been planned to include three phases: (a) a search for hypotheses in three natural situations, (b) the inductive development of a general conceptual scheme, and (c) a series of laboratory experiments now under way. The completed field studies were conducted in three quite different natural settings: the campus of a large state university, the main laboratories of a large research institute, and an architecturally planned suburban neighborhood. We are now attempting to test under controlled conditions the predictive value of some of the anecdotally documented, but *post hoc*, inferences yielded by the initial investigations. At the same time, we have been working to develop a theoretical schema, which cannot yet assume the status of a formal model but is at least a beginning toward condensation and order. Eventually, the schema may be capable of working on its own to generate further hypotheses; at present the translation of basic ideas into the language of the algebra of sets has increased definitional precision and provided an immediate test of the internal consistency of the rationale (22, p. 104 ff.).

Within the time limitations of this symposium, it will not be possible to do more than to mention, in arbitrarily selective fashion, a few of the provocative leads that emerged from the field studies and to refer illustratively to one subsequent experiment. (In other reports, however, the work so far completed has been described in overpowering detail [22, 24].) A cursory review will suffice to provide grounds for a critical look at the initial assumption—that productivity and nonconformity can be constituted as overlapping behavioral categories.

On the basis of structured interviews and the reports of a participant observer, inferences were drawn about a large number of personal, task, and situational variables tentatively allocated to three major sets: (a) conditions antecedent to independence or nonconformity, (b) conditions antecedent to productivity, and (c) a restricted set of mediating or interactional conditions such that in their presence either productive independence is

directly elicited and reinforced, or, given independence, the likelihood increases that it will be assessed as productive. For the present, it will be most useful to focus upon antecedents apparently differentiating productive from nonproductive independence.

First, a kind of syndrome can be delineated that seems to be characteristic of individuals whose behavior in varied settings is seen by relevant others as relatively independent *and* highly productive. Consistent with the inferences of a number of other investigators (2, 3, 6, 15, 29), the single term that most strongly suggests itself is "ego strength." The independence of such people seems to proceed from an internalized, well integrated set of standards in which personal popularity is not a major consideration. They have both spontaneity and self-control; they can be alone without discomfort, but they are able to form warm nonexploitative attachments to others. They do conform to the majority view on matters they see as trivial, but when they differ with others on issues they see as important (13), they can maintain their positions under pressure. They have superior ability, are work oriented and inventive, but in addition they have resources and skills that enable them to live with, to evade, or to surmount limitations and obstacles with which others find it impossible to cope. They are able to take a depersonalized view of their circumstances, to see the forest as well as the trees. It could be said that making things work *for* them acquires a game-like character, but this should not be construed to mean that they have no stake in the outcome of the game. It is more that they are confident of winning and are skilled in strategy (8). Regardless of apparent external restrictions, such individuals typically view assigned tasks and bureaucratic requirements as capable of constructive restructuring; they are sensitive to matters of timing; they are able to "sell" their own ideas and proposals to those in power positions. Over a period of time they build up their "credit ratings" and "buy" more freedom through initial service in terms of existing demands and requirements (19).[2]

It is a sociological cliché to say that nonconformity in one situation is simply conformity to the norms of some other reference group (12, 16, 17, 18, 28). But the distinctive characteristic of people to whom productive nonconformity is ascribed is that their own standards seem more often to have been brought to, than to have been derived from, the groups with which they identify most closely. They are more apt to work toward changing the group or to affiliate with different groups than they are to change themselves.

Though their incidence is rare, such people do seem to happen, but a glib conclusion that productive nonconformity is solely attributable to given qualities of an elite is at once belied. "The lives of great men all remind us"

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[2]Hollander has independently discussed the importance of building up "idiosyncracy credits"(11), and Verba has similarly spoken of conserved "acceptance capital"(30).

that the social-situational conditions that operate in their favor and the very nature of the tasks they undertake can extend or restrict the likelihood that independence will occur and can be productive. To the extent that the task itself is intrinsically motivating and logically permits many alternative or novel modes of solution, the likelihood of productive independence seems to increase.

Several situational variables seem especially pertinent in the context of this discussion. Behavior viewed as productive and independent in an organizational setting seems to be fostered where provision is made for the assignment of atypical persons to special roles or positions with acceptable status, but where standard requirements are minimized, potentially disruptive effects upon others are reduced, and unusual abilities and interests can be utilized. Regardless of the situation, it appears that nearly always—if you look closely—wherever independence occurs and persists, there is some other individual (or agent) who plays the role of "sponsor" or "patron," like the parent who provides independence training for the child(14; 22, pp. 14-15).

The patron or sponsor is a person (or agency) who is not a member of a peer group but possesses prestige or authority in the same social system. He has several significant functions: (a) regardless of his own views the sponsor encourages and supports the other in expressing and testing his ideas, in thinking things through for himself; (b) the sponsor protects the individual from the counterreactions of his peers long enough to permit him to try out his own notions; (c) the sponsor at least keeps the structure of the situation open enough so that independence *can* occur. This last may be a highly significant function. It is, indeed, a real question in our highly organized society whether considered innovation is possible *without* the support of patrons with power. Such sponsorship, however, does not ensure that the protégé's consequent behavior will be assessed as productive.

A related inference, which incorporated the effect of the reinforcement of productivity as well as independence, has been tested experimentally (24). That hypothesis stated that if positive executive sanction of productive independence is expressed, not by lip service alone, but by consistent reinforcement of such behavior through favorable recognition, then behavior that is both productive in terms of task solution and independent of the prevailing peer standard will occur more often than if positive executive sanction is awarded only to productive behavior when it is also visibly associated with deference to majority opinion. As in many real life situations, the task performed by the experimental "subordinate" teams permitted more than one equally "good" solution in each of a series of decisions, and the established majority view was neither always right nor always wrong but varied in the correctness of its judgment. The results gave unequivocal support to the central prediction. The implication is not that the sanctions of a power figure produce independence in the sense of ex-

emption from the influence of that arbiter. It does appear that such influence *can* be used to increase the subordinate's ability to have confidence in, and to act upon, his own judgment and to disengage himself from an uncritical dependence upon his peers.[8]

Now then: Where do all these machinations leave us with reference to the paradox we started out to consider? The hypotheses I have singled out for mention were selected to focus attention upon the problem as it is acted out, in the Omnipresent Organization in particular. Specifically, is it *really* nonconformity if the actor does what is expected of him *in role*— even if that role be a specialized one? Or, is it *really* nonconformity if the actor resorts to calculations of timing and strategy?

I submit that distinctions can be made between productive and non-productive nonconformity (viewed for the moment as characteristic response types) that do not consist in a difference in degree of conformity. It is a quick solution to say that productive nonconformity is simply conformity after all. But actual events are not disposed of so easily. In what respects then does *productive* nonconformity still connote in either a statistical or a psychological sense, relative independence of a prevailing norm?

One distinguishing characteristic recalls Rogers' discussion of the "locus of evaluation" as "residing in" the client in therapy (27). In extension of that concept, productive nonconformity does presuppose that the *loci of task definition and strategy, as well as the locus of evaluation of task relevant alternatives, reside in the actor*, rather than in prescriptions outside the actor. He is less apt to be regarded by his associates as a maverick, however, than if he is seen as *non*conforming and nonproductive. In the research institute where the second field study was conducted, they have a word for it: If the relatively nonconforming actor is viewed as productive, he is called "creative"; if not, he is known as an "oddball."

A related differentiation is *direction* of influence. This property points to a limitation inherent in the observer's reliance upon over-all agreement between actor and others as the sole measure of independence. Such a crude index masks differences between antecedent events in which the actor moves toward the group and those in which the group moves toward him. This is a distinction implied, for example, in Hemphill's concept of the "successful" leader as one who "initiates structure in interaction"(10). It is the difference between the actor as medium or agent of innovation and the actor as supporter of the status quo. It is the difference between the actor who molds and the actor who is molded by his environment. Given instances of initial divergence, degree of deviance is reduced as others move toward the actor's position.

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[8]Our own inference is that under these conditions individualism itself may become an accepted norm. A study by Deutsch and Gerard also implies that "normative social influence can be exerted to help make an individual be an individual and not merely a mirror or puppet of the group" (7, p. 635).

A third perceptible distinction lies in the *distribution and location* of instances of agreement and disagreement with prescribed standards in terms of degree of task relevance of the issues at stake (congruent with Zimbardo's concept of "involvement" as "the individual's concern with the consequences of his *response* or with the instrumental meaning of his opinion" [31]). Given that degree of conformity, measured over the same period in the same setting, is equal and low for two hypothetical actors, but one is assessed as productive, and the other as nonproductive; the former will be more apt to comply with, and the latter to deviate from, established norms in decisions of relatively trivial consequence for task accomplishment. The differential salience of these instances for the perceiver is such that in the first case, the actor is viewed as a person "who goes along with the group unless he disagrees on an important issue," while in the second case, the actor is regarded as a person "who differs just to be different." In contrast with productive conformity, on the other hand, productive nonconformity implies that the actor is task- rather than position-oriented; task accomplishment takes primacy over facade maintenance; his own concern with "impression management"(9) is instrumental to that end, not an end in itself.

In sum, there are differences for the organization between legitimizing the actor's role through "making a place" for him, as opposed to "putting him in his place," or asking whether he "knows his place." There are differences for the actor between a ritualization of existing organizational demands that permits his actions to serve his own "ulterior"—but not necessarily cynical or vicious—ends, and either ritual as its own end or the flouting of rules for its own sake(4). The net effect of the actor's behavior in the first instance is to focus the attention of others upon his substantive contribution, to maximize the visibility of his accomplishment, and to minimize the salience of his deviance.

Questions about the actor's morality are another matter. Whether, in the phrase of the moment, the successful "projection of an image" (deliberate or otherwise) perpetrates a fraud depends upon whether that image serves as a disguise or as a model of what the actor "really is up to." There is clearly nothing generally given as necessarily either good or bad, or productive or nonproductive, about either independence or conformity, per se. At the crux of the observer's value judgments about the socially constructive uses of nonconformity is the content of his own standards and of the standards to which the particular individual and group adhere.

We are committed in our society to an ideology that places a premium upon individualism. But we also confront the seemingly irreversible social facts of bureaucracy and bigness. Perhaps we would be well advised to accept these as given and to try to learn how to select and train individuals for survival under these conditions. The problems presented by extreme *physical* conditions—in submarines, in the Arctic, in space travel—have

been met with experimental ingenuity. The problems of survival under extreme *social* conditions have been studied to find constructive ways of coping with the effects of social *disorganization* or emergency—military capture, concentration camp experiences—but the same view has not been taken toward the study of the extreme of social *organization*. In any case, there often seems to be more "give" within organized social structures than has been exploited.

Among other psychologists who have attempted to account for behavior that can be conceived as both productive and independent, Hollander has laid stress upon "idiosyncracy credits"(11); Jahoda has emphasized personal "investment in an issue"(13); Maslow has singled out "self-actualizing people"(15). In substance, the subjects of our studies seem to reply, "Yes, what each of you says is so—but there is much more to it than that." And yet, despite the great complexity of the general problem, many of the specific inferences to which our field studies led are remarkable in their very familiarity and in their redundancy from situation to situation. The eventual contribution of this project may be, not as much in the content of observations that are new in themselves, as in a different kind of configuration and interpretation of old wisdom.

Finally, I should like to cite a pronouncement by Merton who has recognized that although nonconformity and productivity may pose a contradiction in terms, they may be found to have a correspondence in life:

> Under certain conditions, public nonconformity can have the manifest and latent function of changing standards and values which have become dysfunctional for the group. . . . it is not infrequently the case that the nonconforming minority in a society represents the interests and ultimate values of the group more effectively than the conforming majority. This . . . is not a moral but a functional judgment, not a statement in ethical theory but a statement in sociological theory. It is a statement, finally, which once made, will probably be accepted by the same social observers who, by using an insufficiently differentiated concept of "deviant behavior" deny in their sociological analysis what they affirm in their ethical precepts (16, pp. 366-368).

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Book Reviews

A Landmark in the Study of Unreason and Intolerance

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In our nuclear age there could hardly be a more important subject than this one. The threat of the Communists to peace and to Western democracy is not inherent in the nature of "socialism"; it is inherent, perhaps, in the kind of black-and-white dogmatic thinking that seems to be ingrained in the minds of the decision-makers in Moscow and Peking. Nor is such thinking confined to their side of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. On our side too there are dogmatists who equate black-and-white thinking with firmness, intolerance with strength, and reasonableness with appeasement.

Rokeach's book modestly refrains from stressing its bearing on the problems of preventing war, combatting race prejudice, and other practical objectives; he prefers to remain on the pure science level and leave to others and to later research the task of pointing up practical implications. Nevertheless, in this reviewer's judgment, the book is the third outstanding landmark in the study of the aspects of human nature that make wars possible.

The first was Freud's elucidation of the mechanisms of rationalization, projection, repression, etc., which gave us our best set of clues as to how human thinking is distorted, how human egos are glorified, and how irrational hostilities are made to seem rational. Second was the California research on the "authoritarian personality" by Frenkel-Brunswik, Sanford, Levinson, and others, systematically applying the techniques of empirical research, especially correlation analysis, to a study of the deeper personality dynamics underlying the kinds of thinking that are politically dangerous. Their "F Scale" (F for Fascism) has proved to be a powerful instrument for disclosing and studying the tendencies to unreason and intolerance which exist widely in America, perhaps especially in those who regard themselves as 100 per cent Americans. And the third landmark is Rokeach's book.

Because Rokeach builds on the foundation laid by the California group, it is proper and inevitable that his book should be judged in relation to it. How much, and what, has he added to the contribution of the California study?

Among his many contributions, four are outstanding:

1. *In many contexts his key word "dogmatism" seems more appropriate than "the authoritarian personality."*

It is more modest and limited in meaning, but by the same token it is clearer and often more unequivocally justified.

This is not to say that the word "dogmatism" ever can or should replace "the authoritarian personality." The latter term quite properly suggests the undoubtedly frequent connection between dogmatic thinking and an autocratic, power-oriented, overdocile or overdominating outlook on life; and it quite properly suggests some fascinating hypotheses about the roots of dogmatism and of a power-oriented outlook in a child's attitudes toward his parents. The California group has shown that, at least in many cases, dogmatic and intolerant thinkers have had an undue conscious reverence for their parents, with repression of the hostile component in the normal ambivalence of children toward their parents. Presumably this makes them lacking in ability to evaluate skeptically the ideas of accepted authorities in their adult environment.

It is nevertheless sometimes useful to distinguish between the *meaning* of dogmatism and its undoubtedly complex correlates and causes. In many situations the fact of dogmatism may be clear while its personality concomitants and causes in early childhood are not. For example, some individuals are clearly dogmatic—that is, they cling to preconceptions or established ideas about the nature of reality and defend these in various ways against the impact of inconvenient facts—without showing either exaggerated docility or an exaggerated urge to dominate. It may well be that many conventionally religious, conforming, inconspicuous individuals are of this type. It is unequivocally justifiable to call such persons dogmatic, while it is at least doubtful whether they should be called authoritarian. Also, there are persons who are demonstrably dogmatic, yet we do not know what made them so—for instance, whether they repressed the hostile component in their ambivalence toward their parents. Here again we would probably be wiser to use the more purely descriptive, less speculative term "dogmatic."

2. *The book shows an extraordinary amount of sustained systematic original thinking about the nature of "belief-disbelief systems" and about the dogmatic thought-process itself, well integrated with extensive systematic experimentation.*

This is "theory" in the best sense of the word—the sense that most nearly resembles the function of theory in an advanced science such as physics. It will please especially those readers who (like this reviewer) have a leaning toward "Lewinian" theory, and it can easily bear comparison with Lewin's own theoretical work; though less many-sidedly creative, it surpasses his (in my opinion) in rigor and thoroughness within the area that it attempts to cover.

Unfortunately, Rokeach's intuitive perception of intangibles does not seem to be on a par with his logical rigor and originality; few of the items in his Dogmatism Scale seem to have the inspired ingenuity possessed by many items of the F Scale in catching the overtones of authoritarian feeling and thinking. On the other hand, he surpasses the California group in close reasoning and in ingenuity in relating experiment to theory; his "Joe Doodlebug" experiments, for instance, are a model of successful translation of somewhat abstruse theory into concrete experimental operations, and his brief summary of "the defining characteristics of open and closed belief-disbelief systems" is a model of compactness and theoretical clarity.

In the course of his systematic exploration of the problem, Rokeach comes up with a large number of significant contributions, among which the following should be mentioned: his recognition that beliefs and disbeliefs are intimately

related so that the term "belief-disbelief system" is more accurate than simply "belief system"; his distinction between dogmatism and rigidity, with the term "rigidity" used for difficulty in changing single beliefs while "dogmatism" refers to changes in belief-disbelief systems; his concept of "isolation of parts" within and between belief-disbelief systems, or lack of communication between parts of a system; and his hypothesis that while dogmatism is not related to the analytical phase of the problem-solving process it is very much of a drawback in the more creative or synthesizing phase. This last hypothesis opens a whole vista of inquiry into the relation between dogmatism (or authoritarianism) and creative thinking.

3. *He presents much evidence that dissimilarity of beliefs is a more important basis of intolerance than most of us have realized.*

The germ of this idea is familiar; it is represented, for instance, by the fact that a Southern segregationist may be much more hostile to white "nigger-lovers" than he is to "good niggers" who are content to remain "in their place" as he defines it. Rokeach develops this thought considerably, bringing in much experimental evidence furnished by himself and his colleagues (22 students and colleagues shared in the research and writing embodied in the book); he is prepared to say, on this basis, that perceived dissimilarity of beliefs is the most important determinant of prejudicial, intolerant rejection of other persons. While this reviewer would question Rokeach's interpretation of some of the evidence, it does seem to justify a new emphasis on this psychological factor as distinguished from the physical or sociological factors (race, nationality, class-membership) which have too exclusively occupied the attention of students of prejudice.

4. *He has developed an instrument that is more or less equally applicable to the dogmatism of the Right and to that of the Left—e.g., Communism.*

A major element in the motivation of Rokeach's initial development of the Dogmatism Scale, apparently, was the desire to focus on those modes of thinking and those "primitive beliefs" that would be equally characteristic of dogmatic Communists and dogmatic Fascists or proto-Fascists. He felt that the F Scale was not a measure of general intolerance and authoritarianism but of a somewhat limited form of intolerance and authoritarianism—namely, the Right as distinguished from the Left form. Communists, with their typical rejection of race prejudice, religion, conventional patriotism, etc., typically scored low on the F Scale, though few non-Communists doubt that there is a particular kind of dogmatism characteristic of Communists, which the F Scale was failing to detect. The following typical items from Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale illustrate how carefully he avoided items with specifically Right content:

1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.
6. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
11. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
37. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.
48. There are two kinds of people in the world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

In this attempt he was evidently successful—in spite of what seems to be the needless ambiguity of a number of his items, such as #11 above. For instance, a group of 13 English Communists, though averaging very low in the F Scale, had especially high scores in the Dogmatism Scale.

One strong regret must be expressed: Rokeach has not yet subjected the *items* of his scale, as such, to any sort of scale analysis or factor analysis. This means that there is much ambiguity as to what the scale really measures (it is far less rigorous than his own theorizing about the subject), and there is also ambiguity in all of the superstructure of correlation analysis (including factor analysis) that is built on the scale, and that treats it as a single undifferentiated entity. It is true that the items in the scale have been subjected to the older type of item analysis which consists only of winnowing out the items that do not correlate enough with the scale as a whole, but this kind of item analysis is no guarantee against undue heterogeneity, and hence ambiguity; it may still be that the scale represents two or more factors which would be better and more meaningfully measured by two or more separate scales.

Rokeach himself ran into this difficulty, and faced it honestly, when he analyzed the responses of the English Communists. He found that they seldom agreed with those items in the scale which admitted "personal weakness, feelings of self-deprecation, anxiety, aloneness and isolation, fear of the future, feelings of urgency, or a paranoid outlook on life," while they scored higher than any other group on the total Dogmatism Scale. He does not, however, face the more fundamental question of whether these self-critical items belonged in his scale in the first place. Their presence seems to imply an assumption that some kinds of self-criticism are especially characteristic of the dogmatic person—an assumption which many would challenge. Such questions cannot be finally answered, and the relationship between dogmatism and the authoritarian personality cannot be fully clarified unless there is a factor analysis (or perhaps a scale analysis on seemingly similar items, followed by factor analysis) using many items from the F Scale and also from the Dogmatism Scale, and basing itself on the correlations between each item and each other item in these combined scales.

LEARNING THEORY AND BEHAVIOR. O. Hobart Mowrer. 555 pages. John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1960. $6.95.

In this first volume of a two-volume work, Professor Mowrer presents his synthesis of what is commonly called "the psychology of learning." This synthesis is based on a "revised" two-factor theory of learning. In simplified terms, this theory suggests that two types of reinforcement contribute to learning (i.e., the conditioning of responses): (a) reinforcement constituted in *increments* of either primary or secondary drives, thus leading to the conditioning of *avoidance* responses; and (b) reinforcement deriving from *decrements* in drive, thus leading to the conditioning of *approach* responses.

Professor Mowrer has cast the exposition of his two-factor theory in a historical and comparative framework. Major portions of the book are devoted to a description of the psychological theories and researches preceding the present formulation and to a systematic comparison of the two-factor theory with the facts and theories deriving from other contemporary positions. The thesis argued in this book, and the vociferous language with which it is argued, make this volume an unusually provocative work. It should be stressed, however, that the book is a presentation of *Mowrer's* theory of behavior. This fact, in the opinion of the reviewer, disqualifies the book for use in many situations as a basic text (which the author suggests). The revised two-factor theory is the sole standard with which other viewpoints in behavior theory are compared; no "objective" treatment of these views is attempted. While such an organization is an entirely acceptable way in which to present a new and controversial thesis, it renders the book useful to scholars in a specialized manner rather than as a handbook for teaching.

The value of this volume will be determined by whatever contribution it makes to the future of psychological science. Professor Mowrer's is not the first attempt at a synthesis of our knowledge concerning behavior, nor is it definitive (and the author has not suggested that he thinks it should be). The present version of Mowrer's theory stems from a long-held conviction that the data of psychology cannot be synthesized by means of a single basic hypothesis such as Pavlov's theory of conditioned reflexes or Hull's theory of reinforcement. But while rejecting a completely parsimonious theory of behavior, Mowrer has not chosen (as some psychologists have done) to reject theory altogether. Indeed, this book and the author's entire bibliography reflect deep concern with the formation of a set of integrating principles for the data of psychology. Thus, the reader finds extensive amounts of empirical material summarized and reviewed in this book, but throughout, the work of other investigators is handled so as to buttress the two-factor theory. Mowrer admits to extensive "reshaping and reinterpretation" of much of the data presented. In so doing, he has invited vigorous attack from numerous sources.

The second volume of Professor Mowrer's work is to be entitled *Learning Theory and the Symbolic Processes*. In it, the author will attempt to particularize his two-factor theory of learning in terms of one broad area of human functioning: cognition. Problems of mediation, language, reasoning, and social learning are to be discussed within the framework of Mowrer's theory. The degree to which the author succeeds in applying his theory to the literature dealing with symbolic behavior will provide the reader with yet another means of assessing the utility of *Learning Theory and Behavior*.

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